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School finance experts have known for a long
time that the large disparities in spending for education
between school districts was primarily caused by the great
variation in taxable wealth between the districts.
Attempts to equalize spending differentials between school
districts through the legislative process (state aid)
have historically failed because of the local self-
interest of politicians who are interested in protecting
tax advantages for their wealthy districts. Those seeking
changes in the present school finance system have been
forced to use other avenues to fight the inequities in
state school finance systems. The battle was moved to
the courts.
In Serrano v. Priest , the Supreme Court of the
State of California declared that California's school
funding scheme was unconstitutional because it violated
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The court observed that the school funding system
"invidiously discriminated against the poor because it
makes the quality of a child's education a function of
the wealth of his parents and neighbors." Serr ano
has
vi
ee.rved as a model for six other court decisions, and there
are presently at least forty-five similar suits In varying
stages of litigation.
Taking the school finance crisis as a given and
the uncertainty of most state school financing systems, it
is crucial to examine and evaluate the possible legislative
remedies that flow from this "wealth neutrality principle."
The various school finance plans fall into four
general categories: (1) Pull State Funding Plans;
(2) State and Local Support Plans; (3) Federal Support
Plans; (4) Cross Alternative Plans. The various school
financing plans that are scrutinized cover the range of
real possible developments in school finance plans — three
flat grant models; a power-equalized plan; a federal foun-
dation plan; a district consolidation plan and a voucher
plan. The alternative plans are evaluated on the basis
of four criteria: (1) legal criteria; (2) financial cri-
teria; (3) political criteria; (4) educational criteria.
After evaluating the various alternative plans, the author
concluded that a full-state assumption of educational costs
was the best solution to the present inequities in school
finance. The author also concluded that before change
will occur in present methods of state school finance, a
court order will be needed.
What will happen if the U.S. Supreme Court
vii
supplies the tool for future court orders by allowing
the wealth neutrality principle" to become a precedent?
One thing Is clear. Most states will have to change their
present method of financing schools. It is also clear
that money will be redistribued to poor districts, whose
spending will increase relative to the wealthy districts.
It is unclear whether this will benefit poor and minority
children.
Whether or not the S errano principle is victor-
ious in the Supreme Court, educators cannot assume that the
courts or state legislatures are going to deal with the
real issue -- equity in treatment of children. Equity in
the distribution of school revenue is an essential first
step toward the attainment of improved educational quality
for poor and minority students, but it is only a beginning.
viii
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The Nature and Background
oT the Problem
School finance experts have known for a long
time that there were large intrastate disparities in
local wealth, school tax rates, and in levels of
spending.^- The wide variations in school district
expenditure levels have been primarily attributable to
the heavy reliance on the local property tax for the
support of public education.
There have been a number of attempts to reduce
the effects of the wealth differentials through the
use of state aid plans. The foundation plan (used in
over half of the states) and the percentage equalizing
plan are the two most common approaches used to help
equalize the wealth disparities. If these plans were
applied in their theoretical forms, both would eliminate
the effects of the local wealth differentials.
Unfortunately, the actual impact of the state
aid plans has been far different than their Intent.
^Stephen Weiss, Existing Disparities in Public
School Finance and Proposals for Reform , (Boston:
Federal Reserve Bank, 1970) , p^ ToV
1
2The ineffectiveness of state aid in substantially equa-
lizing the impact of the local wealth differentials has
been caused by a number of factors. The foundation and
percentage equalizing plans have been modified from
their prefer red theoretical forms In a number of ways
which nullify their intended effect. The intended
equalization effect of a foundation plan can be impeded
by setting the foundation level at a very low level.
Foundation plans are often combined with other types of
state aid that neutralize the equalizing impact. A flat
grant, which is often tied to a foundation plan, has an
anti-equalizing effect. 2 Equalization of a percentage
equalizing plan can be effectively nullified by:
(1) guaranteeing minimum state aid ratios for all dis-
tricts no matter what the district's wealth, (2) placing
a ceiling on state aid which prevents full equalization
to take place, (3) placing a dollar maximum that the
state will fund, (A-) limiting the types of spending the
state will support, (5) inadequate state funding, and
(6) refusal to require negative payments from wealthy
districts .
3
2See John E. Coons, William H. Clune III and
Stephen D. Sugarman, Private Wealth and public Education,
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 1970), pp. 106-108.
3weiss, Existing Disparities , pp. 35-36.
3State aid plans and distribution formulas appear
to be more the result of political compromise than
rational educational policy. Politicians who are com-
pelled to be custodians of a parltlcular constituency
instead of being Individuals who are concerned about
inequities in school spending, have been unwilling to
vote against their political interests. Truly equalizing
state finance systems have not been legislated. Those
seeking changes in the present school finance systems
have been forced to look elsewhere for solutions to
the inequities in school finance. The battle for school
financing reform was then moved to the courts.
The legal underpinnings for a constitutional
attack on the inequities in school district spending
were laid by both educators and lawyers in the mid 1960's.
Arthur Wise's thesis in educational administration at
the University of Chicago, which was later developed
into the book Rich Schools. Poor Schools: The Promise
of Equal Educational Opportunity , was the first to
develop the initial argument for a legal attack on a
state's school financing system. He argued that a state
school financing system must satisfy the "educational
needs" of the children or it was unconstitutional under
the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause.^
^Arthur E. Wise, Rich Schools, Poor Schools :
The Promise of Equal Educational Opportunity , (Chicago
:
University of Chicago Press, 196?), p. 133.
4Using Wise's approach as a basis for complaints, suits
were filed in a number of states, but two quick; negative
decisions in the federal district courts of Illinois and
West Virginia^ suggested that the legal approach needed
modification.
Lawyers Jack Coons, William Clune and Stephen
Sugarman, in their book private Wealth and Public
Education
, modified the argument so that it focussed
on disparities in spending per student. Their theory
provided the basis for the first successful constitu-
tional challenge of a state's school financing system
in California. The decision of the Californis State
Supreme Court in Serrano v. Priest declared California's
school funding scheme unconstitutional because it
violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. Since the
S errano decision was reached on August 31, 1971, there
have been four decisions affirming the S errano principle
and one decision denying it.^
^Mclnnls v. Shapiro 293 F. Supp. 327 (1968)
and Buruss v. Wllkerson 310 F. Supp. 572 (1969).
^The decisions similar to S errano were:
Van Dusartz v. Hatfield (Minnesota) 40 uTs.L.W. 2228
( 19tl) ; Rodriguez v. San Antonio (Texas) 40 Law Week
2398 (1972)7 Robinson v. Cahill*^ New Jersey) Superior
Court of New Jersey-Hudson County Docket No. L-18704-69
(1972); and Hollins v. Shofstall (Arizona) Superior
Court of Arizona - Maricopa County No. C-253652 (1972).
In a similar suit, the New York Supreme Court (a trial
court) rejected the plaintiff's claims in Spano v.
5The California Supreme Court observed that the
school financing system in California "invidiously
discriminated against the poor because it makes the
quality of a child's education a function of the wealth
of his parents and neighbors. The Court stated that
the wide disparities in spending among the school dist-
ricts in Los Angeles County were Inevitable because of
the large differentials in taxable wealth. State aid
has closed some of the spending differential, but it
has been insufficient to bring about any significant
equalization. In declaring the use of local property
tax unconstitutional for the support of education, the
Court stated that education was a "fundamental interest,"
and this fundamental right could not be conditioned on
wealth. At least thirty suits challenging state school
financing systems in various states have used the S errano
decision as a model for the complaint. States that have
not had suits filed are vulnerable to such suits, with
the exception of Hawaii. Hawaii has assumed full respon-
sibility for funding its public schools.
Lakeland Central School District (New York) Supreme
Court of Westchester County, Index No. 1056 (1972).
The Van Dusartz and Rodriguez decisions came in federal
district courts while all the other suits were decided
in state courts.
errano v. Priest , California Court Reporter,
5 Cal. 3d 5S4, (l$7i), p.“b^3.
6The Serrano decision is not final, however.
It has been remanded to the Los Angeles Superior Court
for trial on the facts. The other decisions which were
similar to the Serrano decision are not final, either.
One of the cases, Rodriguez v. San Antonio , has been
appealed to the United States Supreme Court by the
Texas Education Agency. On June 7, 1972, the Supreme
Court accepted the case, but a decision will not be
reached for some time. The Rodriguez case will be
placed on the October 1972 docket, and a decision will
be reached later during the session.® Only then will
an accurate picture of the meaning of the S errano
decision emerge —win or lose in the Supreme Court.
Even with the tentativeness of the decisions,
S errano and its progeny are being compared with the
Brown v. the Board of Education decision concerning
their probable Importance for education. The Serrano
decision has been called "the most important event in
school finance in this century. ”9
S errano and its progeny are acting as catalysts
which are causing widespread reexamination of present
^Stephen Browning, memorandum from the Lawyers'
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Feb. 15, 1972.
(See Appendix C.
)
9r. Thomas James, "The Conditions for Educational
Equality: State Aid Models to Achieve Equality," a paper
prepared for the Schoolmen's Day program, Dec. 2, 1971,
p. 2.
7educational finance methods* The legal focus on school
finance Is a timely one because schools are presently
facing an ever-growing fiscal crisis.
Growth in expenditures, for example, haB outrun
the growth in the economy as a whole over the
last decade. Education has averaged a 9.7 per
cent growth in expenditures while the Gross
National product was averaging a 6.8 per cent
annual increase. 1-0
Spending per pupil in public elementary and secondary
schools has increased sevenfold from 193° to 1968
(#130 per pupil to #750 per pupil). 11 Although school
enrollments have started to level off, other factors,
such as rising teacher salaries, the ever-rising cost
of living, and demand for improved educational methods
and materials, will tend to push school costs higher
in the future.
To raise the money to cover the increasing
expenditures caused by higher teacher salaries and
increased capital costs, it has been necessary to
continually increase taxes. Taxpayers no longer
willingly approve increased tax levies and new bond
l0Joel Berke, "The Current Crisis in School
Finance: Inadequacy and Inequality," Phi Del ta Kappan,
Sept. 1971, p. 2.
L1Henry Levin, "The Effect of Different Levels
of Expenditure on Educational Output," National
—
Ed
u
c_a -
tlonal Finance Project, II, 173.
8issues as they once did. In 1969-70, local taxpayers
dipped into their pockets for over twenty billion of the
thirty-nine billion dollars that was spent on
elementary and secondary education. 12
The local property tax is the one tax that the
voter (taxpayer) has a direct say in, and he is saying
"no" to over half of the new budgets being proposed.
In 1970-71, California voters rejected over sixty per
cent of the proposed tax increases and bond Issues.
In Michigan, twenty of twenty-five requests for the
existing tax rate were defeated, while New York State
had 119 school budget increases defeated by voters.
New Jersey suffered the largest number of budget rejec-
tions in its history. 13 As a result of the defeats
of tax rate increases, there have been numerous staff
reductions, which have caused higher pupil-teacher
ratios. Numerous experimental programs have been
dropped because of the lack of funds. Spending for
guidance, psychblogical, and library services has been
cut.
The revenue shortage is only one side of the
problem. The inequitable methods used to raise the
l^Digest of Educational Statistics , 1970, p. 51.
13Berke, "Current Crisis," p. 3.
9revenue (the local property tax) Is the other side of
the school finance crisis. The local property tax
carries the major burden for supporting local govern-
mental services, of which education is one. Revenue
collected from local property levies accounts for
ninety-eight per cent of the money raised by local
school districts. The local districts provided over
half of the money for public elementary and secondary
education in 1970-71 (fifty-two per cent). 14 The heavy
reliance on property tax revenues has serious consequences
for school district spending and tax rates. The uneven
distribution of real property in districts causes wide
variations in levels of expenditures per pupil. The
real-estate poor districts have to tax themselves at
much higher rates in their attempt to achieve spending
l
parity with wealthier districts. Most are unsuccessful,
as is noted in Serrano v. Priest. 1^ State aid does not
l4
"Puture Dimensions in Educational Finance,"
National Educational Finance Project , 1971, p. 9.
^Baldwin Park's assessed valuation per child
is #3,706 per pupil, while Beverly Hills was #50,805
per pupil -- a ratio of 1 to 13. Baldwin Park residents
paid a school tax rate of #5.48 per #100 of assessed
valuation, while Beverly Hills' residents paid only
#2.30 per #100 — a ratio of more than 2 to 1. The
higher tax. rate in Baldwin Park with state aid provided
#577.49 per pupil, while the lower tax rate and state
aid in Beverly Hills provided #1231.72 per pupil in
1968-69. This data is taken from Serrano v. Priest ,
p. 608.
10
come close to equalizing the district spending differen-
tials. In addition, the property tax Is very regressive
(It falls the hardest on the poor), because families
In the lowest Income bracket spend a higher portion of
their income for housing than do higher income people.
Families in the lowest income bracket pay about
thirty per cent more in property taxes in rela-
tion to their income than families in the highest
brackets
.
The property tax has often been arbitrarily administered,
which adds to the inequities. The regressiveness and
the arbitrary administration of the property tax add
another dimension to the school finance crisis.
Taking the financial crisis of schools as a
given and the uncertainty of the constitutionality of
most state school financing schemes which rely heavily
on the local property tax, it is crucial at this time
to try to examine the S errano decision and its progeny
for possible consequences in school finance. This will
require clarification, as concretely as possible, as to
what the courts meant in the school finance decisions.
Then it will be necessary to try to answer some critical
questions relating these decisions to school finance.
What are the remedies called for in the decisions?
^Jesse Burkhead, Public School Finance ,
(New York: Syracuse University Press, 1964), pp. 183-84.
11
Where will the remedies be developed? What impact
are these decision likely to have on education?
The courts have provided an important stimulus
and the impetus for the various state legislatures to
reexamine the present methods of financing public
schools. A number of alternative remedies are emerging
as potential legislative options. Pull-state assumption
of the responsibilities for financing schools is
attracting the most interest at the present time.
Hawaii and the Province of New Brunswick in Canada are
already using this method for financing their schools.
Hawaii spends $984 per pupil in its one state-wide
school district that has 185,000 secondary and elemen-
tary students. 17 The Fleischman Commission, a school
finance commission in New York,l® has recommended a
modified full-state funding plan with a state-wide
property tax.
President Nixon has suggested that the local
property tax be eliminated and that money for local
schools come from a national value-added tax ( a form
of a national sales tax). Estimates by H.E.W. project
17" Hawaii Avoids Disparities," New York Times ,
January 10, 1972, p. 26e.
l^Report of the New York State Commission on
the Quality. Cost and Financing of Elem_e_ntary_and
Secondary Education , 1972.
12
that the value-added tax, at 2\ per cent, could raise
$16 billion, which would be about 40 per cent of the
$39 billion spent on public elementary and secondary
education in 1969-70. ^-9 The federal government would
redistribute the money to the states in the form of
block grants or to the local school districts on a per
pupil basis.
A third potential solution for remedying the
inequalities in school spending would be to redraw dist-
rict lines so as to equalize, as nearly as possible, the
taxable wealth in each district. This could be accom-
plished by consolidating small high-cost districts,
regionalizing other activities, and by metropolitanlzing
other districts.
A fourth alternative has been proposed by
John Coons, William Clune and Stephen Sugarman in their
book Private Wealth and Public Education . Their proposal,
district power-equalizing, is based on the principle
that all districts should have equal power to raise
revenue at the same tax rate. For every tax rate, there
would be a corresponding per pupil expenditure level
that all districts would receive. Under the district
power-equalizing plan, a district would choose the level
19 n Guess Who Finally Pays the Tax," New York
Times , Feb. 6, 1972, p. 3£.
13
at which it wished to spend by selecting a given tax
rate. If a district chose a specific tax rate and it
did not raise the designated amount of money, then the
state would have the responsibility of malting up the
difference. Conversely, if a district received more
revenue than the designated amount at a specific tax
rate, the district would have to surrender all the money
collected over the designated amount for redistribution
by the state.
Other potential remedies, such as the voucher
system, the National Educational Trust (proposed by
Governor Shapp of Pennsylvania) and the modification
of present finance systems, will also be examined in
the study.
The alternative school finance plans described
in the study need to be evaluated before their potential
importance for education can be predicted. The criteria
which will be used to evaluate the alternative plans
for school finance fall into four general categories:
(1) the legal criteria; (2) financial criteria; (3) poli-
tical criteria; (4) educational criteria. The criteria
were designed to cover the critical issues that must be
dealt with in the construction of a new school finance
system. The legal and financial criteria were designed
to reflect the inequities identified in the court deci-
sions on school finance. The political criteria were
14
structured so that they would provide a framework to
analyze the political acceptability of the alternative
school finance plans. The educational criteria d eal
with the crucial question relating the quality of education
to school finance.
The first criterion is that the different plans
must satisfy the fiscal neutrality principle established
in the 5 errano decision and reaffirmed in decisions in
Minnesota, Texas, New Jersey and Arizona. This means
that variations in the ability of local school districts
to support education must be eliminated altogether or
must be greatly reduced by the states. The establishment
of wealth neutrality as a principle for state school
finance has not been settled finally as a legal issue,
but it has generally been accepted as the minimum require-
ment of acceptability for any new state school system.
A second criterion that emerges with the
first is that state school funding schemes should equalize
the tax burden among the school districts and should
equalize their revenue-raising capabilities for the same
tax effort. Although the Serrano decision and its progeny
did not speak directly to the question of equalization of
the tax burden, it is considered a highly desirable
objective by educators, economists and lawyers alike.
15
Ihe third criterion to be used in the evaluation
of the alternative models Is the political acceptability
of the different proposals. There are two significant
aspects tied to this criterion. The first is the issue
of local control of public schools. The local sur tax
option will be a crucial aspect of this debate. The
second aspect of the political acceptability criterion
relates to the question over the cost of the finance
plan. If any significant equalization of educational
spending is to take place, it will come at the expense
of the wealthy suburban districts who will have to pay
the bill in increased taxes. The suburbs generally
have the political clout to make or break any school
finance model suggested in the legislature. It is very
unlikely that any state will initiate a new school finan-
cing program that calls for a significant increase in
the total cost of education for the states. The poli-
tical acceptability of the models will be the crucial
factor in the type of legislation that emerges to remedy
the present inequities in the existing school financing
systems
.
The final criterion is that equal educational
opportunity should be facilitated by the models. The
term "equal educational opportunity," for the purposes
of this study, means that the variations in educational
16
needs of the students should be met through the alloca-
tion of funds on the basis of student weighting. The
funds should be distributed so as to provide low expen-
diture (low taxable wealth districts) with the means to
improve the quality of their educational offering. This
criterion is the hardest to satisfy, but it should be
a central focus of any new school finance legislation. 20
Although the political acceptability of the
different models will be the prime consideration in
the selection of a new school financing scheme, the
impact of the models on the public schools is very impor-
tant because of the educational crises facing the country.
The educational crises are more serious than the finan-
cial problems facing education. They have been well-
documented by numerous scholars and writers, notably
Charles Silberman, Kenneth Clark, Paul Goodman, Jonathan
Kozol, John Holt, Ivan Illich, and the list could go on
almost endlessly. Education damages many children by
schooling them to think that teaching is learning, that
grade advancement is education, and that a diploma
20por further information on criteria for
evaluating state school financing models, see "Evaluating
State School Finance Plan," National Educational Finance
project, Vol. V, pp. 231-263, and Jokn SllardT s article
'^Legislative Options for Achieving public Education
Equalization," an unpublished paper presented to Lawyers'
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, 1971.
17
represents competence. 21 Many children are taught to
be failures In school. 22 close to forty per cent of
the students who enter high school drop out before they
finish, and of the dropouts who return to school,
seventy-five per cent leave again. 23 Those students who
remain In school Instead of dropping out are provided
drastically different facilities and learning experiences.
This has been documented by the Coleman Report. Academic
achievement varies widely within our society and minority
groups " scored substantially below white students" 2^
on all the tests administered. In urban areas, the
crisis is more acute. Urban schools are helping to
cause academic retardation in all too many students.
Test results in reading demonstrate this vividly in
New York City. 2 ^ "One of the most striking phenomena
21Ivan Illich, Deschoollng Society , (New York:
Harper & Row, 1970) , p. 1.
22See John Holt, How Children Fall , (New York:
Dell, 1964), and William Glass er, "( Sobools~l?lthout
Failure
,
(New York: Harper & Row, 1969)
.
23Holt, How Children Fall , p. 15, and Paul
Goodman, Compulsory Mls-educatlon , (New York: Vintage,
1964)
,
p. l5.
24<jhe Coleman Report — Equal Educational
Opportunity , 1966, p. 20. See Appendix aT
25"scribner Asks for Improved Instruction in
Reading," New York Times , Feb. 20, 1972, p. 55.
See Appendix B for datai
18
in the Public Evaluation Program score data is that
over time, more and more children are falling below the
minimum competence in both reading and mathematics. "26
The urban schools are creating a pattern of rejection,
despair, hopelessness, and generally a massive wastage
of large numbers of human beings.
The situation is not much more encouraging in
other schools either. In a survey taken in New York in
1971, "more than 66 per cent of the students sampled
indicated that they did not enjoy school," while many
students indicated that their school experience was
painful. 28 Studehts are dropping out physically and
mentally. Increasing numbers are turning to drugs as
an escape from the boring routine of school while others
are actively fighting schools' regimentation through
demonstrations and protests. As one student quipped:
"You have to have grown up in Scarsdale to know how
bad things really are." 2^
26
"Home Life Linked to School Success," New
York Times , Jan. 30, 1972, p. 14.
27Kenneth Clark, "Alternative public School
Systems," Harvard Education Review , Vol. 38, No. 1,
Winter 196b, p. Iol.
—
28Renort of the New York State Commission on the
Quality, CosT and Financing of Elementary and Secondary
Education
,
p. 1. 58.
29charles Silberman, Crisis in the Classroom ,
(New York: Random House, 1970), p. 2o.
19
The crisis in schools today is both financial
and educational. Will the recent court decisions provide
a vehicle for reforming school finance? If the reforms
do, in fact, take place, what will be their effect on
the low expenditure districts? Assuming that the poor
districts get more money to spend, will this raise the
educational quality in those schools? The importance of
this last question cannot be overstated.
The Purposes of the Study
The purposes of the study are: (1) to ascertain
the meaning of the recent court decisions concerning
inequalities in school district wealth, tax rates and
levels of spending; (2) to explore the potential signi-
ficance of these decisions for school finance; (3) to
identify alternative models that can be used as remedies
for the inequalities in state school financing systems;
(4) to evaluate the alternative models for school finance.
Definition of Terms
Foundation Plan . — This plan is a guarantee of some mini-
mum level of state support for all school districts, with
the intention of compensating for disparities in local
ability to support schools.
Percentage .Equalizing Grants . -- This approach involves the
20
use of formula, such as:
otate Aid Ratio - = (1- wealth ratio for district 1)
which determines the amount of school revenue that will
be allocated to the local districts by the states. The
state aid ratio varies inversely with the relative local
wealth.
Equalized Valuation Per Pupil . — This is used as the
measure of local ability to pay for schools. It is
calculated by dividing the number of pupils into the
total assessed valuation. This number reflects the
ability of local districts to pay for schools.
Equalized Valuation
.
-- This is the value of the real
property expressed on an " equalized" basis (some fixed
ratio of full market value)
.
Full-State Funding
.
— This is the state assumption of
the responsibility for financing local schools.
District Power-Equalizing . -- All districts choosing
the same tax rate would spend at the same level. A
minimum and maximum spending level would be established
by the state. If a district did not raise enough money
locally at the stipulated tax rate, then the state
3°Weiss, Existing Disparities , p. 34.
21
would make up the difference. If a district raised
more than the designated level of spending at the speci-
fied tax rate, it Would have to surrender the amount of
money to the state that was raised over the designated
amount. The state would use these funds for redistri-
buting money to poor districts.
Sur T ax Add On . -- This is a local property tax that
the state would allow each district to levy to raise
revenue above the amount the state supplied.
Equal Protection Clause
.
-- This is the clause in the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution which
states that equal protection and security shall be
given to all under like circumstances in his life, his
liberty, his property and in the pursuit of happiness
and in the exemption from any greater burdens and
charges than are equally imposed upon all in like
circumstances.
Fourteenth Amendment . -- The Fourteenth Amendment protects
citizens in that " . . .no state shall make or enforce
any law
. . .
which shall abridge privileges or immuni-
ties of the United States; nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty or property without due
SlBlaok 1 s Law Dictionary , 3rd Ed., (St. Paul,
Minnesota; West Publishing Co., 1968), p. 631.
process of law; nor deny to any person within Its
Jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. "32
22
The Limitations of the Study
The ambiguity and tentativeness of the recent
court decisions is a limiting factor In the study. The
United States Supreme Court is now faced with the res-
ponsibility of malting the final decision on the consti-
tutionality of the local property tax as a support for
public schools. Even with the ambiguity of the Serrano
decision and its progeny, their influence is already
being felt in many legislatures throughout the country.
The concept of fiscal neutrality is becoming widely
accepted as a standard for school financing systems as
many legislatures begin to reexamine their school funding
systems
.
The great diversity in school finance systems
in the various states poses another limitation, but all
states except Hawaii rely heavily on the local property
tax to support schools. Most of the states use either
a foundation plan or a percentage equalizing plan for
distributing state aid. Each state will be affected
differently by the alternative models because of varia-
tions in population, regional differences, and economic
variations.
32u,s, f Constitution, Amendment XIV.
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The focus of this study will be on Intrastate
spending disparities that have been the focus of the
recent school finance decisions starting with Serrano v ,
Priest . Interstate and lntradlstrlct spending disparities
are not examined specifically In the study, and this Is
a limitation of the study.
The lack of an acceptable definition of equality
of educational opportunity Is another limiting factor.
Educators have been unable to agree on an operational
definition of equal educational opportunity. Two views
are widely held. The traditional view of equal educa-
tional opportunity is essentially related to equal
access to schooling. The minimum requirement for this
to exist is that approximately equal facilities, curri-
cula, staff and expenditures must be present. Given
equal access to schools and equal Inputs in those schools,
it becomes the individual' s responsibility to determine
the quantity and quality of educational benefits he or
she will derive from that system.
A more contemporary view relates equal oppor-
tunity more closely with equality of achievement.
According to this view, resources are to be used as
tools for reaching specific goals that relate to the
educational needs of each child. Each child or group
of children in society should benefit approximately
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equally from the educational system and If an Individual
or group does not, then changes In resource distribution
should be made to bring those groups In line with the
achievement pattern of others. Should schools push
for equality of achievement or for the excellence of all
students? There Is no simple answer to the equall tarlan-
libertarlan dilemma.
The ambiguous relationship between levels of
spending per pupil and academic achievement of students
poses another limitation to the study. The Coleman
Report and numerous studies have concluded that Increases
in spending do not improve achievement, while still
other studies have found a positive relationship between
resource inputs (all of which are affected by the level
of spending) and academic achievement
.
33
33por further information, see Alan Wilson,
"Educational Consequences of Segregation in a California
Community," Racial Isolation in the Public Schools
.
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Governmentprinting Office, 1967);
Thomas Pettigrew, "Race and Equal Opportunity," Harvard
Educational Review
.
Vol. 38, No. 1, Winter 1968, pp. 66-
76; Thomas Ribich, "The Effect of Educational Spending
on Poverty Reduction," National Educational Finance
Project
,
Vol. II, 1971; and Christopher Jencks, "A Re-
appraisal of the Most Controversial Education Document
of Our Time," New York. Times Magazine , Aug. 10, 1969.
For studies that relate resource inputs positively
with achievement, see James W. Guthrie, et . al .
,
Schools and Inequality
,
National Urban Coalition, 1969.
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The Significance of the Study
There are a number of people who are concerned
about and are studying the problems of school finance.
Several books and many articles have been written exploring
the legal and financial issues Involved in the question
of inequalities caused by state school financing systems.
Yet none of these works has tied together all the aspects
of the problem so that a comprehensive picture of the
problem and alternative solutions emerge. The urgency
of such a study is dramatized when the different crises
facing education are identified (the fiscal, legal and
educational)
. The various state legislatures face the
task of restructuring their school financing schemes
because of the legal attacks on the inequalities in
school spending. The study should provide an important
information base for educators and legislators. The
meaning of the recent court decisions on school finance
need to be clarified. It is crucial that the alternative
models for school finance be defined and evaluated in
the context of these decisions.
This study is an outgrowth of the author's
experiences with the Massachusetts Task Force for Equity
in Education which was established by the University of
Massachusetts in beptember, 1971.
CHAPTER II
REVIEW OP THE LITERATURE
Chapter II Is organized into two sections.
The first section will review the literature which
described the per pupil spending inequities between
school districts and the legislative attempts to equalize
spending through various state aid plans. The second
section will focus on the literature which explored the
constitutional questions that relate to the per pupil
spending disparities between school districts. This
section will concentrate primarily on Arthur Wise's book;,
Rich schools. Poor Schools and John Coons', William
Clune's and Stephen Sugarman's book, Private Wealth and
Public Education . Wise and Coons collectively developed
the concept of a constitutional challenge to the spending
disparities in 1962, 1 but have pursued different approaches
to the same problem since then. Both books provide an
analysis of the legal and economic issues Involved in
the question of inequities in school finance. The differences
Ijoel Burke, "Equality of Educational Oppor-
tunity: Some Unresolved Educational Policy Issues,"
California Supreme Court Decision ( Serrano v. Priest )
,
(Los Angeles: University of California, Nov. 12, 1971),
P. 36. 2g
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In legal approaches which evolved between Wise and
Coons, et al
,
led to opposite verdicts In sultB Involving
per pupil spending inequities between school districts.
In addition, supporting literature which dealt with
equal protection constitutional analysis and spending
disparities will be examined.
Per Pupil Spending Disparities and State Aid
It has been apparent for over seventy years
that there have been wide disparities in spending between
school districts, but little equalization has been achieved
in that time. In 1905, li.P. Cubberley observed that poor
districts were forced to tax at many times the rate of
p
rich districts to support local schools. He was
primarily concerned with the school districts' ability
to support education, rather than in equalizing spending
disparities between districts. Cubberley proposed that
a flat grant be provided to all school districts by the
state to facilitate the maintenance of local schools,
but with a maximum of local financial support and a mini-
mum of state support. ^ State aid was to be distributed
to school districts on the basis of the number of teachers
tlonment,
2g.p. Cubberley, School Funds and ihelr Appor-
(New York: Columbia Teacher's College, 1905)
,
p. 15.
^Ibld.
,
p. 219.
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employed by tne districts rather than on the basis of the
number of students attending the schools. Poor school
districts were still forced to tax at higher rates and
spend at lower levels than wealthy districts. The flat
grant has historically been funded at inadequate levels,
and all districts, irrespective of wealth, receive flat
grants. The local property tax remained the principal
source of educational revenue for local schools. 2* The
flat grant, as conceived by Cubberley, did little to
remove local wealth as the determining factor in school
spending.
During the 1920's, the foundation plan emerged
in various states as a method for distributing state aid
to local school districts. George otrayer and R.H. Haig
developed the concept of the foundation plan from their
work with the Educational Finance Inquiry Commission
(1921-1924) and expanded it in their book, Financing
of Education in the State of New York in 1923. The
foundation plan established a dollar minimum level of
spending per pupil at which the state would support
public education. To qualify for the foundation program,
a local school district had to tax at a stipulated rate
which was generally set at a low level. If the amount
of money raised by the local school district, at the
4Ibid.
,
p. 219.
29
stipulated state tax rate, was not as much as the founda-
tion level, then the state provided enough money to bring
the district up to the foundation level. Districts were
allowed to tax at higher rates than the one established
by the state, and they were allowed to keep all the
additional revenue raised.
Paul Mort, in State Support for Public Schools
(published in 1926), modified the basic foundation plan
by adding student weighting and focussing on the issue of
the district's ability to pay for schools. Unfortunately,
the foundation plan had many weaknesses and has had very
little equalizing effect on local school district spending.
The most obvious weakness of the foundation plan is its
political sensitivity.
The state legislatures have generally compro-
mised the equalizing aspect of the foundation plan for
the political interest of their constituency. The result
of the political vulnerability of the foundation plan
has resulted in low levels of guaranteed support to
local school districts and low levels of taxation.
Required foundation plans are often coupled with flat
grants which have an anti-equalizing effect, and this
adds to the spending disparities between school districts
rather than alleviating them. The foundation plan has
been the primary method of state support for public
30
education and over two-thirds of the states use some
form of the foundation plan.
Harlan Updegraff developed a new concept in
state school support in 1922. 5 After he had identified
the spending disparities between school districts,
Updegraff proposed a variable level foundation. ^ His
plan was designed to reward school districts that taxed
at higher efforts and also to equalize disparate levels
of spending between school districts. Updegraff' s propo-
sals were not accepted during his lifetime. His theories
on state school support later became known as the percen-
tage equalizing plan which Eric Lindman reintroduced in
the 1930's. ^ Again the percentage equalizing plan failed
to attract the attention of school financiers.
Charles Benson, a nationally known educational
finance expert, popularized the percentage equalizing
plan in his book, The Cheerful Prospect .^ Benson
thoroughly documented the spending disparities between
local school districts and argued convincingly for a
^Harlan Updegraff, Rural School jurvery of New
York: Financial Support , ( Ithaca: by author, 1922)
.
6Ibid.
,
p. 117.
^Eric Lindman, "Implementing a School Finance
Alternative," California Supreme Court Decisions , (Los
Angeles: University of California, Nov. 12, 1971), p. 25.
^Charles Benson, The Cheerful prospect ,
(Boston: Houghton & Mifflin, 1965), PP* 90-9.
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percentage equalizing plan. Yet, as of 1969, only five
states (Iowa, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island and Vermont) had adopted percentage equaliz-
ing plans.
9
Numerous writers have Identified the great
differences in educational spending between districts.
In 1930, Henry Morrison, writing in School Review
, noted
that there were great inequities of wealth among school
districts and argued that these caused great inequalities
in educational opportunity. 10 He proposed that all local
school districts be abolished and that a state support and
administration plan be constructed. Morrison's suggestions
never were well received, but the defects in school finance
that he described in 1930 persist today.
In 1961, James Conant identified the problem
in Slums and Suburbs . He stated that the contrast in
money available to the schools in a wealthy suburb and
the schools of a large city "Jolts one's notion of the
meaning of equality of educational opportunity." 11
In 1961, Myron Lieberman described the fiscal inequities
9johns. et. al.. Alternative Programs for
Financing iiducation, National Educational Finance Project,
1971, P.' 2J5 :
^Henry C. Morrison, ochool Review , (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1930]
.
11James Conant, Slums and Suburbs , (New York:
McCraw-Hill
,
1961), pp.2-3.
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between school districts In an article In Language and
Concepts In .Education
.
12 Steven Weiss, In Public School
Finance and Reform (1970), examined the financial status
of New England's schools and found large Intrastate dis-
parities that exist In local wealth, school tax rates and
levels of spending between districts. l‘he Quality of
Inequality: Suburban and Urban public Schools (1968),
a book; edited by C.V. Laly, described the spending diffe-
rences between urban and suburban schools. In 1969, the
Advisory Commission on Intergovernment Affairs, In its
report "State Aid to Local Governments , " focussed a major
portion of the study on the inequities in school finance
and made recommendations that included a full-state
assumption of school costs. A study completed in 19^9 by
Guthrie, Levin, Kleindorfer and Stout for the National
Urban Coalition, Schools and Inequality , concluded that
the wide differences in spending between districts had an
impact on pupil achievement, students in poor school
districts performed at lower levels than pupils in nigh-
expenditure districts. This conclusion was contrary to
the Coleman Report's conclusions.
1
^ Ihe Coleman Report
indicated that there were wide disparities in spending
12^iyron Lieberman, "Equality of Educational
Opportunity," Language and Concepts in Education, (New
York: Rand McNally, 196l) , p"! 127 *
^Guthrie, e t . al . , Schools and Inequality,
(National Urban Coalition, 1969T» P-
33
between schools and school districts, but that the
students' home life accounted for the differences that
resulted In achievement which occurred rather than the
spending differences. 14
the National .educational Finance Project,
directed by R.L. Johns and financed primarily by title V
money, has published five volumes over the past four years
on educational finance. The N.E.F.P.'s studies, the most
complete and current collection of information on school
finance thus far compiled, were an excellent source of
information. Volumes IV and V provided information on
school spending disparities (interstate, interdistrict
and intradistrict), the impact of state and federal aid
on schools, school district organization and criteria for
evaluating state financing plans.
The New York State Commission on the Quality.
Cost and Financing of Elementary and Secondary Education
Report was a valuable document in the preparation of tnis
study. This study, known as the Flelschman Commission
Report
,
provided information on the inequalities in
spending between and within school districts in New York
State and recommended that the state assume the full costs
of supporting education. The recommendations in the
Flelschman Commission Report are the most complete to
l4Coleman, e t . a 1 . , Equality of Educational
Opportunity
,
1966, p. 22.
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date and should serve as one model for a full-state
support plan for financing schools.
It has been obvious that disparities in levels
of spending between school districts have been around for
a long time, and it is just as obvious that the attempts
to equalize the disparities have not been successful
through the legislative process. The next section focusses
on the legal analysis of the spending disparities, and how
the attack on them began in the courts.
Constitutional Analysis of Per Pupil Spending Disparities
This portion of the review of the literature
will examine the development of the constitutional analysis
under which an equal protection challenge to the inter-
district spending inequalities was mounted. This section
will focus on the two principle works in the field:
Arthur Wise's Rich Schools. Poor Schools and Coons, Clune
and jugarman's Private Wealth and Public Education .
Both books have been instrumental in the process which
led to a successful constitutional challenge of inter-
district spending disparities.
In 1968, Arthur Wise's Rich Schools, Poor Schools
was published as an outgrowth of his doctoral disserta-
tion at the University of Chicago. Wise was the first
person to do a thorough analysis of the possible arguments
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that could be used in a constitutional challenge of the
spending disparities between school districts. He leads
the reader through a step-by-step historical analysis of
Jupreme Court decisions on whioh a possible constitutional
challenge could be mounted. Wise traces the developments
in Supreme Court decisions in the areas of civil rights,
the rights of Indigent criminals and voter equality,
including the one-man-one-vote issue and the poll tax
issue. ^5 Using the recent Supreme Court decisions, he
constructed three alternative arguments which could be
chosen by the Supreme Court if it were to question the
constitutionality of school district spending inequalities
on the basis of local wealth.
The three tentative arguments were:
1. "Discrimination in education on account of race is
unconstitutional. Discrimination in orlminal proceedings
on acoount of poverty is unconstitutional, iherefore,
discrimination in education on aocount of poverty is
unconstitutional.
2. "Discrimination in eduoation on aooount of race is
unconstitutional. Discrimination in legislative apportion-
ment on account of geography is unconstitutional, there-
fore, discrimination in eduoation on account of geography
is unconstitutional.
^See Chapter III, p.57 for an explanation of
these cases.
36
3. Li scriminatlon in education on account of race is
unconstitutional. Discrimination in voting on account
of poverty is unconsti tutional
. Therefore, discrimination
in education on account of poverty is unconstitutional."^
Based on his legal analysis of the recent court
decisions, Wise felt that a suit challenging the disparities
in educational spending might receive a favorable decision
in the supreme Court.
Wise proceeded to examine various definitions of
equal educational opportunity. His first example was a
negative definition which stated that equal educational
opportunity can not depend on the economic circumstances
of the child’s geographic location. Wise felt that of all
the definitions of equal educational opportunity he examined,
the negative one had the best chance of being accepted by
the dupreme Court since it did not specify what the condi-
tions of equality were.
The Judicial arguments established by Wise in
Rich dchools. Poor Schools became the legal framework; for
a series of court cases which challenged state school
funding schemes in a number of states on the grounds that
the state school finance laws allegedly denied equal
l^Arthur Wise, Rich Schools, poor Schools ,
University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 167.(Chicago
:
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protection of the laws to the students .
^
x he plaintiffs
in Mclnnis v. Shapiro ,-*-® the most prominent case that grew
out of Wise's analysis, argued that a financing system
would only satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment if it distri-
buted money on the basis of the "educational needs" of
the pupils. i’hey asserted that the spending disparities
between school districts caused by differentials in wealth
were unconstitutional. Ihe legal arguments which Wise
established for attacking the inequities in school spending
were sidetracked on the issue of the "educational needs"
of the students in Mclnnis v. Shapiro and in Buruss v.
Wllkerson . ^9 x'he suits were dismissed in both instances
by federal courts because they were considered to be
"non Justiciable. " Ihis meant that the courts had no
"manageable standard" by which to determine when the
Constitution was satisfied or not. 20 Wise's neatly
^Mclnnis v. Shapiro 293 F. supp 327 (N.D. Ill
1968) affirmed sub, nom. . Mclnnis v. Qgllvle 394 US 322
(1969), Buruss v. Wllkerson 397 US 7^ (1970), .Detroit
Board of Education v. Michigan No. 10334-2 (Circuit Court,
Wayne County, Michigan, Filed Feb. 8, 1968)., S_er£ano__v.
priest 5 Cal. 3d. 584 (1971), Rodriguez v. San Antonio
40 Law Week 2398 (1972). The 3 erran
o
and Rodriguez
cases were modified from their original form dropping the
issue of spending based on the educational needs of the
students
.
1968 )
.
l8McInnls v. Shapiro 293 F. supp 327 (N.D. 111.
^Buruss v. Wllkerson 397 US 74 (1970).
^Subsequent decisions in New York and Maryland
Mclnnis decision for their precedents, oee
more complete analysis
have used the
Chapter III , 46-53f"or a
and its progeny.
of Mclnnis
3b
rationalized constitutional arguments which led to the
suits filed In Mclnnls and Buruss were dismissed because
the courts had been asked to make a decision they were
not capable of making or enforcing.
A different approach to the spending inequities
question was developed by John Coons, William Clune and
Stephen Sugarman In Private Wealth and Public Education.
They argued that a constitutional challenge to spending
inequities between school districts could still be made
even after the early setback in Mclnnls . Their book
traces the development of educational finance and shows how
the state finance systems formulated in the 1920's (the
foundation plan) have helped to perpetuate the unequal
intrastate distribution of resources through today.
After thoroughly documenting the wealth disparities in
various states and destroying the myths about the actual
equalization achieved by the present state aid plans, the
authors moved on to describe the district power equalized
21
system of school finance which they developed.
The district power equalizing scheme closely
resembles the ideal percentage equalizing system. Under
this plan, a district's level of spending is solely a
function of its tax effort. Every district that makes
'X* effort receives 'y'dollars, no matter how much they
raise. If that effort produces less than '
Y
* dollars,
213e e Chapter iv,pp. 109-13 for a more detailed
discussion of district power equalizing.
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then the state makes up the difference. If that effort
produces more than 1 Y 1 dollars, then that money Is
turned over to the state which redistributes it to the
poor districts.
The central thrust of the last section of the
book was to establish "Proposition I: "The quality
of public education may not be a function of wealth
other than the total wealth of the state." 22 The authors
asserted that the spending inequalities were created by
the state governments through school finance legislation.
They examine the racial discrimination cases, the voter
rights cases and the indigent criminal cases and conclude
that wealth was a suspect classification when it affected
a "fundamental interest.
"
2 3 They went on to argue that
education was a "fundamental interest" similar to those
in the desegragatlon, voter rights and indigent criminal
cases. The authors asserted that education plays a
vital role in democracy, that it is so important states
have made it compulsory, that it benefits everyone, and
that education has a crucial impact on a man's future
both socially and economically. For these reasons, the
22John Coons, William Cltine and Stephen Sugarman,
Private Wealth and Public Education , (Cambridge, Mass.:
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 304.
23see Chapter III,pp*35-6 for a^raore complete
legal analysis of "fundamental interest.
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authors argued that education was a fundamental interest. 2^
Goons, Clune and Sugarman avoided the problem
of having to define "equality of educational opportunity"
by stating that quality is determined by the level of
per pupil spending, and they thus avoided the legal prob-
lems of trying to define equality of educational opportu-
nity and "educational needs" which was the Judicial down-
fall of the suits based on Wise's constitutional analysis.
The constitutional arguments so artfully constructed by
the authors of Private Wealth and Public education became
the central focus and legal basis for the Serrano v.
Priest decision, rhe California Supreme Court ruled that
California's school financing scheme was unconstitutional.
It argued, as Coons did, that the differences in levels
of spending between school districts were a function of
wealth rather than choice. The opinion in Serrano v.
priest follows consistently the arguments developed in
private Wealth and Public education .
Other writers were also interested in the legal
issues involved in the spending disparities question.
Phillip Kurland, a noted constitutional authority, in
an article entitled "Equal Educational Opportunity:
The Limits of Constitutional Jurisprudence Undefined,"
2
^Xhis line of reasoning was followed by the
Supreme Court of the State of California in the 3 erran£
v. Priest opinion.
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expressed reservations about using the equal protection
clause as a vehicle for attempting to achieve equaliza-
tion of educational expenditures
.
26
^e f e it that the
state legislature was the proper authority for such change
since the problems involved were very complex
.
26 Kurland
argued that courts should deal with simple and enforceable
issues and the Mclnnis suit provided neither a simple nor
enforceable standard. His constitutional analysis had
an important impact on the decision reached by the federal
district court in Mclnnis v. Shapiro .
The large majority of articles which appeared
in the literature supported the concept of a judicial
assault on the inequities in spending for education
between districts. Harold Horowitz and Diana Neitring
observed that where state and federal courts upheld
legislation which provided a local option, few of the
decisions involved suits that touched upon fundamental
interests. 2^ They observed that when fundamental
pH
interest was involved, as in Brown v. Board of Education
25Phillip Kurland, "Equal Educational Opportunity:
The Limits of Constitutional Jurisprudence Undefined,"
University of Chicago Law Review , Vol. XXXV, 1958> P» 583.
26Ibid
.
,
p. 595.
2?Harold Horowitz and Diana Neitring, "^qual
Protection Aspects of Inequalities in public Education
and Public Assistance Programs from Place to Place Within
a State," UCLA Law Review, 1968, Vol. XV, pp. 787 _9«
26Brown v. Board of Education 274 NS 483 (195^0
•
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that the local option fell along with the state's power
to impose the discriminatory legislation upon all of its
territory. Horowitz' and Neitring's study provided an
important support for Coons', dune's and Sugarman's
thesis.
David Kirp, in ,frhe Poor, The Schools and Equal
Protection," argued that the poor should seek equalization
of school spending through judicial involvement
.
He
asserted that education was a fundamental right in the
same way that a right to a trial and the right to vote
are, and that these rights can not be denied on the basis
of a person's poverty. Kirp advocated challenging school
district boundaries following the lead of the voter rights
cases or challenging the state aid formulas as suggested
by Arthur Wise.
John illard and Diane White, in an article in
the Wisconsin Law Review entitled "Inequalities in Public
Education," discussed the legal framework for the consti-
-7 O
tutlonal challenge of interdistrict spending inequalities.
Silard and White argued that the criteria that the federal
2
^David Kirp, "The Poor, The schools and Equal
Protection," Harvard Education Review , Vol. 38* No. 4,
Pall 1968, pp. 63^-68 ,
3°john Silard and Diane White, "Intrastate
Inequalities in Public Education: The Case for Judicial
Relief Under the Equal protection Clause," Wisconsin
Law Review, Vol.
,
No. 1, 1970, pp. 5-3^.
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district court used to decide the Mclnnis case was non-
jus ticlable were debatable. They did not offer an alter-
native way to attack: the problem constitutionally.
Ferdinand Schoettle, in a very thorough article
in the Columbia Law Review
, examined the nature of the
spending inequities, reviewed and summarized the equal
protection analysis that led to the Serrano decision.31
He assessed the role of the court in protecting the poor
against inequities in public education and concluded
that S errano and its progeny were on shaky constitutional
ground since recent court decisions involving fundamental
interests and poverty ( Dandridge v. Wllllams 32 and
James v, Valtlerra33) cast serious doubt on whether the
status of poverty merits strict scrutiny under the equal
protection clause. He felt that the conservative makeup
of the present Supreme Court was another reason why
S errano was on thin judicial ice. He suggested that the
taxpayers were disadvantaged and that spending inequali-
ties could be attacked in a roundabout method by attacking
the unequal tax levies of different school districts.
-^Ferdinand Schoettle, "The Equal Protection
Clause in Public Education," Columbia Law Review , Vol.
71, December 1971, No. 8, pp. 135^-141$.
32pandrldge v. Williams 397 US 471 (1970).
33james v. Valtlerra 402 US 137 (1971).
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Two men starting with the same Idea ended up
with different approaches to the problem of disparities
in spending between school districts. ihe legal results
of the different approaches will be examined in the
next chapter which focusses on the litigation of Mclnnls
v, ohaplro (Wise's judicial approach) and Jerrano v. Priest
(Coons, Clune and Sugarman's approach).
CHAPTER III
REVIEW OP THE LITIGATION:
MCINNIS V. SHAPIRO AND SERRANO V. PRIEST
The first attempt to achieve a constitutional
invalidation of a state's school financing system was
initiated in Detroit, Michigan, in February of 1968.
Although the suit was quickly bogged down in the Michigan
court system, it served as a model complaint for other
states. In mid-April, a similar complaint was filed
in Illinois before a three-judge federal district court.
Before the year was over, the three- judge district court
had dismissed the suit for lack of merit. Mclnnis v.
Shapiro ^- was appealed directly to the U.S. Supreme Court,
2
and by March of 1969, the Supreme Court had summarily
affirmed the district court's decision without oral
argument or opinion.-^ Thus, the first attempt to have
^•Mclnnis v. Shapiro 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D.
111 . 1968 ).
2
a
decision in a federal district court can be
appealed directly to the U.S. Supreme Court.
^The U.S. Supreme Court decides most of its
cases by denying certiorari or denying to hear the
cases, and thus allowing the lower court decision to
stand.
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a state' s school financing system declared unconstitu-
tional failed for reasons which are here examined.
Mclnnls v. Shapiro was the first constitutional
challenge to a state's school financing scheme to proceed
through the courts. The suit was brought by lawyers
associated with the Office of Economic Opportunity Legal
Services Program on behalf of parents of seven Chicago
school children who resided in four Cook County school
districts. It challenged the legality of the Illinois
school financing system which relies primarily on local
property tax revenues for money in each school district.
The plaintiffs claim that these statutes violate
their fourteenth amendment rights to equal pro-
tection and due process because they permit wide
variations in the expenditures per student from
district to district, thereby providing some
students with a good education and depriving
others, who have equal or greater educational
need.^
The three-judge federal district court stated:
The underlying rationale of the complaint is that
only a financing system which apportions public
funds according to educational needs of the
students satisfies the Fourteenth Amendment.-5
The Illinois school funding scheme was scrutinized closely
by the district court. It was noted in the decision
that in 1966-67, the 1,300 school districts spent on the
^Mclnnls v. Shapiro , p. 329.
5ibid.
,
p. 331
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average $840 per pupil, of which 75 per cent came from
local sources. Twenty per cent was derived from state
sources, and five per cent came from federal aid. The
court noted that the wealth of individual districts
varied widely, and per pupil expenditure varied between
$480 and $1,000 per pupil.
Illinois has a foundation program which guaran-
tees $400 per pupil. A flat grant of $97 per elementary
pupil and $54 per high-school pupil is provided to each
district on a per pupil basis. The flat grant accounts
for one-third of the state aid. Equalizing grants are
awarded to districts which levied a minimum rate and did
not derive $400 per pupil. The equalizing aid made up
the difference between the $400 foundation level and the
actual amount of revenue raised. The court concluded:
Thus, the equalization grant tends to compensate
for variations in property value per pupil from
one district to another.
6
The court said that inequalities of the existing
system were apparent, but that they were not unconstitu-
tional. The court observed that the legislature had
provided for decentralization of taxation and decision
making so local communities could choose which services
they valued most highly. Some may choose police protec-
tion, fire protection or improved roads over education.
^Ibld.
,
p. 330.
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This decentralization of control to allow for local
choice and experimentation was rational according to
the court because the state had guaranteed all school
districts $400 per pupil.
The legal bases of the plaintiff's suit were
on the recent U. S. Supreme Court decisions in school
desegregation, voting rights and criminal justice.?
The Mclnnis court was not convinced and cited the fact
that Brown v. Board of Education^ and Hobson v, Hansem^
did not undermine the validity of Illinois' public
financing system because in those cases, the classifying
factor was race, not wealth.
Actually, there is little direct precedent
because the contentions now presented are
novel. But, the few relevant cases indicate
that plaintiffs must resort to the legisla-
ture rather than the courts.
?Some of the cases that were important in laying
the ground work for the school finance cases were:
(1) desegregation cases -- Brown v. Board of Education
347 U.S. 483 (1954); Hall vT"5t. Helena parish Scho ol
Board 368 U.S. 515 (1962): and Griffin v. County School
Board 322 F. 2d. 322 (1963); and (2) indigent criminal
cases — Griffin v. Illinois 351 U.S. 12 (1956); and
Gideon v. WalnwrTght 372 if.S. 335 (1963).
^Brown v. Board of Education 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
^Hobson v. Hansen 269 F. Supp. 401 (1967)
^According to the federal district court, the
students were not deprived of their civil rights because
guarantees on per pupil spending do not exist. See
LaBeauf v. State Board of Education 224 F. Supp. 256
Iv./T). T,a 1965 Tand Hess v7 Muldaney 213 F. 2d. 15
Alaska, 40 (9th Circuit 1954)
.
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The court said:
Even if the Fourteenth Amendment required that
expenditures be made only on the basis of pupils'
educational needs, this controversy would be
non Justiciable. 41
The court felt it could not determine when the Consti-
tution would be satisfied or when it was being violated,
because there was no "discoverable and manageable
standard. "12 The COurt went on to describe the problems
of using "educational needs" as a yardstick to measure
equality of educational opportunity. It stated that
disadvantaged children should receive more rather than
equal expenditures, and that a rule forcing equal expen-
ditures would really be unequal. Thus, the complaint
demonstrated no cause of action because "the Fourteenth
Amendment does not require public school expenditures
be made only on the basis of pupils' educational needs, "15
and because of the lack of a Judicially manageable
standard. In addition, the court rejected the applica-
bility of the strict scrutiny equal protection standard,
because "the legislature designed the school financing
HBy stating that Mclnnls was "nonjustlciable,
"
the court meant it could find no "discoverable and manageable
standard" by which the Constitution would be satisfied
or when it would be violated. Thus, the court had no
way of making a ruling in favor of the defendants, even
if it had found a constitutional violation in the Illinois
school financing system. See Mclnnls v. Shapiro , p. 335*
12Ibld.
15Ibid
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system to allow Individual localities to determine their
own tax burden. 1^
Buruss v. Wllkerson I 5. a case similar to Mclnnls
.
was dismissed in Virginia, and the court relied on the
Mclnnls decision for its precedent. The Mclnnls and
g uruss decisions were both appealed to the U. 3. Supreme
Court and both were affirmed summarily without opinions
or oral arguments ( Mclnnls v. Ogllvle^ and Buruss v .
Wllkersonl7)
, The first Judicial attack on the inequi-
table methods in which schools are financed was a failure
primarily because it was tied to the concept of "educatio-
nal needs."
The court observed that the plaintiffs did not
offer a definition for "educational needs" and stated
that it understood "educational needs" to be:
. • . the interaction of several factors such as
the quality of teachers, the student's potential,
prior education, enviornraental and parental up-
bringing, and the school's physical plant.
Evaluation of these variables necessarily requires
detailed research and study, with concommitant
decentralization so each school and pupil may
be individually evaluated. 18
l^Ibid.
,
p. 536.
l^Buruss v. Wilkerson 310 F. Supp. 572 (D. W.
Va. 1969).
l^McInnls v. Ogllvle 397 U.S. 422 (1969).
l^Buruss v. Wilkerson 397 U.S. 74 (1970).
l^McInnls v. Shaptiro , p. 329.
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The court's understanding of "this nebulouB concept'!
Is as accurate as any educator's, and that Is the prob-
lem. if educators don't agree on a definition for
"educational needs," how could the federal district
court be expected to develop a Judicial standard to
determine when a student's educational needs were or
were not being met through the distribution of school
revenue?
A second reason that Mclnnls was dismissed by
the court was that two alternative methods for Improving
school finance In Illinois were suggested by the plain-
tiffs. The first suggestion was that all students receive
the same dollar expenditures. The second alternative
would be for the state to "syphon off all money In
excess of $400 per pupil which was produced by a given
tax rate, In effect eliminating variations in local
property values while leaving districts free to establish
their own tax rate"^9 ( a district power equalization
plan). The court stated that changes in "the allocation
of public revenues Is a basic policy decision more
appropriately handled by a legislature than a court." 20
Thus, the court avoided making a policy decision that It
19Ibld.
,
p. 329
20Ibld.. p. 335
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was In no position to carry out and also avoided a cer-
tain political conflict with the legislature. Coons,
Clune and Sugarman accurately observed that the decision
in Mclnnis:
... was the predictable consequence of an
effort to force the court to a precipitous and
decisive action upon a novel and complex issue
for which neither it nor the parties were ready. 21
However, the movement for equity in school
finance in the courts was not dead. A suit which had
originally been patterned after Mclnnis
.
but later modi-
fied, was filed in Los Angeles, California in 1968.
On August 3if 1971, the Supreme Court of the State of
California decided the case of Serrano v. Priest
.
22
The six-to-one ruling declared that California's school
financing scheme denied equal protection and that it:
. . . invidiously discriminates against the poor
because it makes the quality of a child's educa-
tion a function of the wealth of his parents and
neighbors. Recognizing as we must that the right
to an education in our public schools is a "funda-
mental interest" which cannot be conditioned on
wealth, we can discern no compelling state purpose
necessitating the present method of financing.
We have concluded, therefore, that such a system
cannot withstand constitutional challenge and
must fall before the equal protection clause. 2 3
21John Coons, William Clune and Stephen Sugarman,
Private Wealth and public Education , (Cambridge, Mass:
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 312.
22Serrano v. Priest 5 Cal. 3d. 584- (1971).
23serrano v. Priest, p. 632.
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Concisely stated, that Is the essence of the Serrano
decision, but It is necessary to examine the case more
closely to distinguish it from Mclnnls and to try to
determine what the court meant.
The court first examined California's school
financing system. Wide variances in spending per pupil
were evident when the school districts in Los Angeles
County were examined. These disparities in spending
occurred because of the large differences in local wealth
as measured by assessed valuation per ohild. Statewide,
the principle source of school money (55.7 per cent in
1968^69) was the local property tax in each school dis-
trict. State aid provided for 35.5 per cent of the money
for local schools, while federal aid made up about 9.8
per cent of the funds. California had a "foundations
program" which guaranteed a minimum support of $355 per
elementary and $488 per secondary student. The aid was
supplied in two basic forms: (1) basic aid ($125 per
pupil regardless of district wealth), and (2) equaliza-
tion aid (which was distributed Inversely to the wealth
of the district). If local taxes and basic state aid
failed to bring a school district's spending to the
foundations' minimum, then equalizing aid made up the
difference. The equalizing aid helped close some of the
gaps, but wide differentials still existed. In 1968-69,
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Baldwin Park spent $577 per child, Pasadena spent
$840 per child, and Beverly Hills spent $1,231 per child.
Baldwin Park residents could not, however, be said to
care less for education than Beverly Hills residents,
because they were taxing themselves at twice the rate
(5.48 per $100 pf assessed valuation v. 2.39 per $100).
The court stated:
The source of disparities is unmistakeable; in
Baldwin park, the assessed valuation per child
totalled only $3,706; in Pasadena, assessed
valuation was $13,706; while in Beverly Hills,
the corresponding figure was $50,885— a ratio
of 1 to 4 to 13. 24
The court further stated:
Furthermore, basic aid, which constitutes
about half of the state funds, actually widens
the gap between rich and poor districts. 5
Thus, Beverly Hills receives the $125 flat grant while
not qualifying for equalizing aid. The flat grant
enlarges the economic chasm between Beverly Hills and
Baldwin park. 2^
After the factual analysis of California's school
financing system, the court began its three-step consti-
tutional analysis by examining the question of which
equal protection test to use: the rational basis test
or strict scrutiny. In general, the U. S. Supreme Court
24Ibid.
,
p. 604.
25ibld . , p. 608.
26s ee Table 1 on page 88 in Chapter IV for a
further explanation of how a flat grant has an anti-
equalizing impact.
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has shown restraint in reviewing the constitutionality
of state economic laws. 2? it has merely required that
the laws bear a "rational relationship to a conceivable
legitimate state purpose." 2® Conversely, it has held
that in cases involving "suspect classifications" or
touching upon "fundamental interests" that strict scru-
tiny must be applied. 29 Under strict scrutiny, the state
law must demonstrate that the distinctions drawn are
"necessary to further a compelling state purpose. "50
The court said that wealth was a suspect classification
and education was a "fundamental interest."
2?S errano
. p. 608.
28Ibld
.
.
p. 609.
29strict scrutiny equal protection standard is
a constitutional test applied to cases that are held to
involve "suspect classifications" or touching upon "fun-
damental interests." When the U.S. Supreme Court reviews
the constitutionality of state economic laws, it generally
uses the "rational basis test." To meet this test, the
law must merely demonstrate that it bears a rational
relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose.
Conversely, under the tougher "strict scrutiny test," the
state must prove that legislation is " necessary to
further a compelling state interest." A ^suspect
classification" is "suspect" when a court will invali-
date the classification unless it can be shown to be
"necessary" in the service of some "compelling state
interest." Compellingness means that the "challenged"
classification must be strictly relevant to whatever
purpose is claimed by the state and in the fairest and
least restrictive way. For additional information, see:
Frank: Michelman, "The Supreme Court, 1968 Term Forward:
On protecting the poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, '!
Harvard Law Review, Vol, 83, 1969, pp. 28-30.
50s errano v. Priest, p. 609.
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The plaintiffs had contended that the school
funding scheme classified on the basis of wealth. The
court, relying on its initial factual analysis, stated:
"We find this proposition irrefutable."^ 1 The defendant's
arguments that the system did not discriminate on the
basis of wealth were dismissed as "groundless" according
to the court. 52
The second step in the court's analysis was to
determine if education was a fundamental interest. The
court related that until recently, wealth classifications
have been declared unconstitutional only in conjunction
with two fundamental interests — voting rights (i.e.
Harper v. Vlrg;lnla33) and right of defendants in
criminal cases (i.e. Griffin v. Illinois^ ). The
plaintiffs contended that education was a "fundamental
interest" and, therefore, could not be conditioned on
wealth. The court agreed, even while noting that there
was no direct legal precedent. It examined the "indis-
pensable role" education plays as a key determining
factor in an individual's chances for economic and social
success In American society. The fundamental Importance
31ibld
. ,
p. 610.
32jbld.
,
p. 610.
33Harper v. Virginia 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
34flrlffin v. Illinois 351 U.S. 122 (1956).
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of education was demonstrated In Brown v. Board of
Education 347 U.S. 183, (1954). The court cited
education as a determining Influence in the development
of citizens. "55 it noted that an unequal education led
to unequal Job opportunities and lower income. The
court drew anologies between education and Indigent
criminal rights and voting rights. It stated that a
man s wealth should not determine his chances for a
fair trial, nor should a man's address determine the
weight of his vote. Furthermore, wealth or a parent's
address should not determine the quality of a child's
education. The court concluded that education was a
fundamental interest for the following reasons:
a) education was essential for the maintenance of
individual opportunities, and the preservation of "free
enterprise democracy;" b) education is universally
relevant; c) public education continues over a lengthy
period of time; d) education is unmatched in the extent
to which it molds the personality of the youth of
society; and finally, e) education is so important that
the state has made it compulsory.
The court thus needed to determine whether the
California school financing scheme was necessary to
achieve a compelling state purpose. This aspect of
the suit touched upon the crucial question of autonomy
5^s errano, p. 615.
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of the. local school districts. It separated the Issue
of local control Into two components: (1) local decision-
making In administration and (2) promotion of local fiscal
control over expenditures for education. The court said
that no matter how large a portion was financed by the
state, the decision-making power could be left in the
hands of the local school districts. It concluded, there-
fore, that local school finance systems were not necessary
to the administration of local schools. As for the
question of local control over the level of spending,
the court said: "Under the present financing system, such
fiscal freewill is a cruel illusion for poor districts ." 36
If assessed valuation is the main determinant of how much
a district spends for schools, then only a district with
a large tax base can fully choose how much it really cares
about education. The court concluded that the present
funding scheme actually deprives the poor districts of the
option to choose how much it cares about education, and
even if local funding presented a compelling state interest,
there were less onerous alternatives which would permit all
local school districts equal choice in how much it cares
about education.
The court next dealt with the question of terri-
torial uniformity. The defendants contended that territorial
uniformity was not required in school finance. The court
36Ibld.
,
p. 620.
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did not agree and cited the voter apportionment cases as
a reference, "If a voter's address may not determine the
weight to which his ballot is entitled, surely it should
not determine the quality of his child's education.
There has been disagreement over what the court meant
in its analysis of the territorial uniformity question.
Jack: Coons, lawyer and co-author of Private Wealth and
Public Education
. interpreted the court as referring
to the issue of equality of tax effort over a geographic
region. Arthur Wise, author of Rich Schools. Poor Schools ,
interpreted the court as having said that there must be
equality of expenditure throughout the region. Coons'
analysis seens the most consistent with the rest of the
opinion. The court concluded that the present fiscal
arrangements for school in California were not necessary
to promote a compelling state interest and, therefore,
did not withstand the "strict scrutiny" test.
It next dealt with the question of the applicability
of the Mclnnls precedent, which the defendants strenuously
used to argue that the question had already been decided.
The opinion stated that even though the U.S. Supreme
Court had affirmed Mclnnls and Buruss, it did not close
the question. The court said that the Issues were sub-
stantially different from those in Mclnnls . In Mclnnls,
37ibld, p. 622
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the plaintiffs emphasized the concept of "educational
needs" as the proper standard for measuring school
financing against the equal protection clause. 38
The California Supreme Court felt that it was not faced
with the same question, and so it dispensed with the
Mclnnls challenge.
Serrano was decided on a motion to dismiss and
hence was argued on the assumption that the plaintiffs'
facts were true. The court was satisfied that the plain-
tiffs had alleged facts showing that discrimination did
exist. The earlier judgement of the Los Angeles Superior
Court was reversed, and the case was remanded to the
trial court for a hearing on the truth of the alleged
facts
.
The S errano decision may prove to be the most
important court decision for education since Brown v .
Board of Education in 1954-. But the decision is tentative,
which the California Supreme Court went out of its way
to emphasize in an October 21, 1971 clarification.
It pointed out that it had not yet actually struck
down the California school funding scheme, but had merely
ordered the trial court to examine the facts. If the
trial court then determines that the alleged facts are
true, however, it must find the system unconstitutional.
38xbid.
,
p. 23.
61
The S errano decision has served as a catalyst
In school finance decisions. Since late August, 1971,
there have been four similar decisions that have used
S errano as a Judicial precedent. The cases were
Van Dusartz v. Hatfleld-^(Mlnnesota) f Rodriguez v.
San Antonio 40 (Texas), Robinson v. Cahill^ 1 (New Jersey),
Hollins v. Shof stall2*-2 ( Arizona) , and Sweetwater County
v . HI nkle^ ( Wyoml ng ) . The Van Dusartz and Rodriquez
decisions were adjudicated in federal district courts,
while the Robinson and Hollins decisions were adjudicated
in state trial courts. Each of the opinions relied
heavily on the Judicial rationale established in the
S errano opinion.
The Van Dusartz v. Hatfield decision struck
down the Minnesota school financing scheme, and it was
the second court decision to do so. The Van Dusartz
holding modified the Serrano decision in an important
way by stating that the "quality of a child's education"
?9Van Dusartz v. Hatfield 40 U.S.C.W.2228 (1971).
^Rodriguez v. San Antonio 40 Law Week 2398 (1972).
^ Robinson v. Cahill Superior Court of New Jersey-
Hudson County Docket No. L-i 8704-69 (1972).
42Holllns v. Shofstall Superior Court of Arizona-
Maricopa County No. C-£b3032 (1972).
^Sweetwater County v. Hinkle Docket No. 3998,
Wyoming.
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may not be a function of wealth, other than that of the
state's (as Serrano did). 44 Van Dusartz stated that:
the level of spending for a child's education may not
be a function of wealth other than that of the state
as a whole.
"
45 This modification of the wealth of
neutrality principle, as it was established by Coons,
Clune and Sugarman, and accepted as the standard by
the California Supreme Court, is an important change.
It takes away the vulnerability of the plaintiff's
having to define "quality education," as measured in
dollars, and instead, moves the issue to a level of
spending per child, which is a much more manageable
standard. The court did not prescribe a remedy, but
merely declared the present method unconstitutional.
The federal district court in Minnesota retained
Jurisdiction over the case, but deferred further action
until after the 1971-1972 Minnesota legislative session.
The Rodriguez v. San Antonio decision is similar
in nature to the S errano and Van Dusartz decisions.
Texas' state school financing scheme was declared
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment's equal
protection clause. The Rodriguez decision was decided
by a three-judge federal district court, which means
44S errano
,
p. 604.
45yan Dusartz v. Hatfield 40 U.S.L.W. 228 (1971).
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that a direct appeal can be made to the United States
Supreme Court by the defendants. On April 17, 1972,
the State of Texas filed its Jurisdictional statement
with the Supreme Court for its appeal of the Rodriguez
decision.^ The plaintiffs ( Rodriguez ) responded to the
Texas Educational Agency's appeal within the thirty days
they were allowed, and on June 7, 1972, the Supreme
Court decided to hear the Rodriguez case. It will be
placed on the docket for the October 1972 session of
the Supreme Court, and a decision will be reached on
it during the session.
Two suits similar in nature to S errano and its
progeny, have been dismissed by the courts in New York
and Maryland. In Spano v. Board of Education of Lake -
land Central School Dlstrlct^declded by the Supreme
Court of the State of New York, County of Westchester
(a trial court), the existing system of school finance
was upheld. The trial court dismissed the suit on the
grounds that "the applicable law is contained in Mclnnls
and Buruss.^8 Judge Joseph Hawkins felt that the changes
46 .
Stephen Browning, of the Lawyer's Committee
for Civil Rights Under Law, "Letter to Friends of the
School Finance Reform Movement," April 14, 1972, p.1.
^Spano v. Board of Education of Lakeland
Central School District Supreme Court of the State of
New York, County of Westchester, Index No. 1056 (1972).
48Ibld, p. 6.
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in the school finance system "should be fashioned by
more supreme authority."^ He was referring to the
Legislature of New York and the United States Supreme
Court. The Spano decision, however, has not been a real
setback for the school reform movement. First, it was
adjudicated in a trial court, and secondly, it is the
reaffirmation of the Mclnnls decision that does not
seem relevant because of the change in focus from
"educational needs" to the issue of level of spending.
In a federal district court in Maryland, another
suit similar to S errano was dismissed. In Parker v.
Mandel^0 Judge Harvey specifically rejected the argument
that education is a "fundamental interest" and consequently
the application of the strict scrutiny test. Instead,
the "rational basis" equal protection standard was applied
and the suit was dismissed. The Spano and Parker decisions
seem to be two compelling reasons for the U.S. Supreme
Court to settle the apparent legal contradictions, as
it now has the opportunity to do because it chose to
hear the Rodriguez case.
The prospects of the Supreme Court upholding a
Serrano-type decision are not that optimistic, according
to many observers of the Court. Ferdinand Schoettle,
a Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota, thinks
^Ibld
,
p . 10.
^Parker v. Mandel, Civil Action No. 71 “1089-8,
Maryland
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that the Serrano decision Is on tenuous Judicial ground.
He cited two recent United States Supreme Court rulings
in cases dealing with poverty and the application of the
strict scrutiny standard to support his claim. In
Dandrldge v
. Williams .-^ the Supreme Court stated that
though it recognized that a ceiling placed on welfare
payments per household challenged one of the "most basic
economic needs of impoverished human beings," it could
find "no basis for applying a different constitutional
standard. "52 The Court thus upheld the welfare celling
placed on the households in Maryland, concluding that
the legislation dealt with "state regulations in the
social and economic field, not affecting freedoms
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. "53
In J ames v. Valtlerra ,54 the U.S. Supreme Court
sustained the validity of a requirement of the California
Constitution that no low-rent housing projects could be
undertaken by the state without approval of the affected
community in a referendum. A three- Judge federal district
51 pandrldge v, Williams 397 U.S., 471 (1970).
52perdinand Schoettle, "The Equal protection
Clause in Public Education," Columbia Law Review ,
Yol. 71, December 1971, No . . 8, p^ 13677
53xbid.
,
p. 1367.
54james v. Valtlerra 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
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court held that this provision was a violation of the
equal protection clause on the grounds that it placed
burdens on the poor and minority groups not placed on
middle and upper class groups. The Supreme Court reversed
the federal district court's ruling stating that
referenda were a traditional feature of California
and America's democratic system of government.
John Coons argued, on the other hand, that the
Valtl erra decision:
. . . actually supports the "fundamental! ty"
of the interest in education. The Court
there emphasized the special Importance
of the democratic process exemplified
in local plebiscites. That perspective
here assists pupil plaintiffs who ask
no more than equal capacity for voters
to raise money in tax referenda, thus
making the democratic process all the
more effective. 55
This line of reasoning was used by the Judge who wrote
the opinicn in the Van Dusartz v. Hatfield decision in
Minnesota.
Paul Dimond, a lawyer at Harvard's Center for
Law and Education described the Valtlerra decision
from a different point of view. He supports Schoettle's
argument that the Valtlerra decision actually damages
the potential of a Serrano -type decision's chances
for a Supreme Court victory. He observed that the
55s ee Footnote 9 in Van Dusartz v. Hatfield .
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local millage election was in fact, very similar to the
local referendum regarding housing. Dimond stated that
the court must be convinced:
... that education is somehow fundamentally
different from "housing"; despite all the
persuasive arguments and skills Coons
and company can muster on behalf of Propo-
sition I (the wealth neutrality principle),
their constitutional argument may well be
less than convincing when it finally encoun-
ters the Supreme Court. 56
It is possible that the S errano principle may
face a harder constitutional fight because of decisions
in other areas than school finance. One such case is
Johnson v. New York State Education Department 40 U.S.
L.W. 2127 (1971). In Johnson , the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, in a two-to-one ruling, held that
fees for textbooks were not an Invidious discrimination
on the basis of wealth and that education was not a
"fundamental interest" as the plaintiffs had argued. 57
If the U.S. Supreme Court upholds the Johnson decision,
then Rodriguez will face an even harder time than is now
projected in the Supreme Court. If Johnson should win
in the high court, then it would improve Rodriguez
1
s
56paul Dimond, " Serrano : A Victory of Sorts
for Ethics, Not Necessarily for Education," Yale Revie_w
of Law and Social Action, Vol. 2, No. 2, Winter 1971>
p. 135.
57john Coons, William Clune and Stephen Sugarman,
"A First Appraisal of Serrano," Yale Review of Law and
Social Action, Vol. 2, No. 2, Winter 1971, p. H2.
CHAPTER IV
SCHOOL FINANCE INEQUITIES
AND
SOME POTENTIAL REMEDIES
The school financing crisis has been characterized
by the inequitable distribution of revenue among public school
districts and the inequitable method in which school
revenue has been raised. It is the purpose of this chapter
to help define the nature of the school finance crisis, to
briefly examine the significance of the S errano decision
and i 1 8 progeny for school finance, and to identify some
alternative remedies for the school finance crisis which
flow from the S errano decision.
N ature of the School Finance Crisis
It has been apparent for some time that a crisis
in public school finance was inevitable. The signs have
been unmistakable. The squeeze between rising costs and
lagging revenues has finally caught up with education.
Growth in expenditures, for example, has
outrun the growth in the economy as a whole over
the last decade. Education has averaged a 9.7 per
cent annual growth in expenditures while the Gross
National product was averaging a 6.8 per cent
annual increase.
^
Ijoel Berke, "The Current Crisis in School
Finance: Inadequacy and Inequality," Phi Delta Kaplan,
September 1971, p. 2.
74
75
School spending has increased as a per cent of the Gross
National Product from 3.1 per cent in 1929 to 7.5 per
cent in 1969. 2 The annual expenditure per pupil in public
elementary and secondary schools has Increased over
eight-fold from $108 in 1930 to $926 in 1970. 5
Although school enrollments have started to
level off, rising prices and the pressure of higher teacher
salaries will tend to push public school spending higher.
In addition to the obvious increased costs of education,
there are a number of indirect costs which are not inclu-
ded, but add another dimension to the crisis. Ten per
cent of the students in America attend private schools,
which, though indirect to the cost of public education,
add significantly to the total cost of education. The
cost of on-the-job training programs offered by industry
and the government are not included in the cost of public
education. The largest single indirect cost of education
is the earnings which students do not receive because they
attend school.
Foregone earnings of students, aged 16-and-
above, were estimated at between $20 and $30 billion
in 1967, assuming approximately 75 per cent of
them could have found employment if they so desired.
2p^^rQg-t, of Educational Statistics 197Q » P» 21.
3ibid.
,
p. 58.
^Joel Berke and James Kelley, The Financial
a q -n pn ts of Equality of Educa tional Opportunity
—
rn
'Plchool ffInane e,l he S elect Committee on gqua
Opportunity, U.sT Senate, January 1972, p. 7.
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Raising money to cover the ever-increasing costs
of education has required higher tax effort on the part
of taxpayers. The trend of increasing costs continues
with a major portion of the increase going to higher
teacher salaries. Taxpayers are no longer automatically
approving increased school taxes and bond issues. There
has been a taxpayer's revolt which has been putting a
financial squeeze on public schools. Of the £39 billion
spent on public education in 1969-70, £20.1 billion (52.7
per cent) of that amount was raised at the local level
where the taxpayer has a direct say in school spending
via the vote. ^ In I960, only 11 per cent of the bond
issues put to voters were rejected. By 1965, the rate
of rejection had increased to 33 per cent, and by 1970,
the rejection rate had climbed to 52 per cent.^ A recent
Gallup Poll on education demonstrated that the majority
of voters sampled in the nation were against increased
taxes for schools: 40 per cent were for tax increases,
52 per cent were against tax increases and 8 per cent
had no opinion. ? in California this past year, over
60 per cent of the proposed tax increases and bond Issues
^Digest 1970
, p. 51.
^Berke, "Current Crisis}' p. 3.
^Gallup Poll on Education 1971, Phi Delta
Kappan
,
September 1971, p. 38.
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were rejected by the local voters. In Michigan, twenty
of twenty-five requests for the present tax rates were
rejected. NewJersey had more budgets rejected than at
any other time in its history.® The budget and school
bond issue defeats have had a serious impact on the school
programs in communities that defeated the requests for
present levels or additional levels of tax revenue.
Staff reductions have been one response to the
lack of money in school districts with a resulting increase
in the pupil-teacher ratio. Over 9,000 teachers were not
rehired in California this past year, while the school
enrollment Jumped by 100,000. In Michigan, 248 adminis-
trators and 4,480 teachers were released in September,
1971. The personnel area has not been the only aspect of
the school program to suffer. The Dayton schools closed
completely for a time because of the lack of money, as
have other school districts throughout the country. In
California in 1970-71, there were thirty school districts
that ran out of money before the school year ended.
Numerous experimental programs have ended because of
lack of revenue. Cuts in spending have occurred in other
areas that are critical to the schools' program. Spending
for guidance and psychological services have been cut.
Library services are another area where the budget cuts
®Berke, Current Crisis, p. 3.
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have been felt the hardest. Certain non-academic courses
such as art and music have been dropped from some school
programs to keep down costs.
The fiscal problems in urban schools are even
more serious than fiscal problems in schools elsewhere.
The Riles Report (President Nixon's Task Force on Urban
Education) documented the problems thoroughly. The
Report cites six key factors for the recent financial
crisis of urban areas:
1. The population migration of the middle class from
central cities has meant that urban areas have suffered
a decrease in tax base. Further, they have been
forced to provide transportation facilities, fire
protection and police protection to the commuters
while being drained of their tax base.
2. Urban education costs more than suburban education
because of higher salary needs for teachers, the
large portions of money needed in educating the
"disadvantaged," the high cost of building sites
and construction, and the high maintenance costs.
3. State aid formulas have been inadequate and in many
states add to the already large disparities in
spending per pupil.
4. The dwindling public support for education for
urban areas has put a tighter squeeze on already
tight budgets.
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5» ihe 1 liianclal difficulties of non-public schools haa
caused a large increase in central city schools putting
a further drain on the school budgets.
6. The final reason for the financial crisis in urban
schools has been the minimal impact of federal aid.
In 1969, federal funds accounted for only 7.3 per
cent of school budgets throughout the country.
9
The financial problems of urban schools are
further aggravated by legal, traditional and socioeconomic
constraints. State constitutions, legislative mandates
and municipal policing powers all take precedence over the
school board's authority, thus restricting a school board's
budgetary autonomy. The tendency of urban school systems
to be locked into civil service and inflexible personnel
systems acts as a serious constraint on urban schools.
Finally, two-thirds of the variation in per pupil expen-
ditures among the nation's largest 107 districts was
accounted for by the wealth of the district and the socio-
economic background of its population. 10
The role of the local property taxes in school
finance adds another dimension to the fiscal crisis. The
property tax continues to carry the major burden for local
9ihe Riles Report (president Nixon's Task Force
on Urban Education), Congressional Record , January 20,
1970, p. E 26.
10Berke and Kelley, Financial Aspects , p. 24.
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governments' portion for support for education. The local
property taxes account for 98 per cent of the revenue
raised locally by school districts, and the local school
districts provide 52 per cent of all monies for public
schools. 11 The heavy reliance on property tax revenue
has serious implications for taxpayers and educational
finance.
The major criticism of the property tax is that
it is a regressive tax that takes proportionally more from
minority and poor groups than it does from wealthier groups
in our society. The property tax is paid directly out of
income whether an individual owns property or rents.
According to Alex Wynnyczuk, professor of Economics at
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, rents paid by tenants
are 15 to 20 per cent higher because of the use of the
property tax. 12 Dick Netzer, a nationally known property
tax expert, illustrated the regressiveness of the property
tax by stating:
Individuals who earn less than $2,000 per
year lose more than seven per cent of their income
to property taxes while persons making over
$15,000 per year pay about three per cent of
their income to property taxes . . . 1 ^
lln Future Dimensions in Educational Finance,"
National Educational Finance Project, 1971 , p. 9.
12Alex Wynnyczuk, Letter to the Editor, N ew
York Times , February 18, 1972, p. 32.
^Lick Netzer, Economics of the Prop erty Tax,
Brookings Institute, Washington, D.C., 1966, p. 75.
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Besides the regressiveness of the property tax, there are
a number of other negative features.
A serious problem of the property tax becomes
apparent when assessment practices are examined. They are
often administered in ways that are arbitrary and discri-
minatory. In practice, assessors generally are very good
at assessing the value of low and moderately priced housing
because that's where most of their experience takes place.
This means more than likely that the owner of such housing
will not get a break in the assessment of his property.
On the other hand, high-priced homes and valuable indus-
trial property are not within the common experience of
most assessors. It is the industrial, business and high-
value residential property where more of the arbitrariness
in assessment occurs. Valuable properties are much more
likely to be undervalued than low and moderately-priced
housing, and this adds to the regressiveness of the pro-
perty tax. 1^
As would be expected, the property tax has
important implications for businesses. If property taxes
are low in an area, then it will tend to encourage new
businesses to enter the area. If taxes are high, it will
tend to discourage new businesses from entering. High
14
,^or more information on unequal patterns of
assessment, see: Arron and Oldman, "A ssessment-Sale
Ratios
Under the Boston Property Tax, National 1 ax Journal,
March 1965, Vol. l8, No. 1; and also, Netzer s
Economi c s
of the Property Tax .
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taxes have, in fact, been encouraging businesses already
located in the area to leave. The property tax favors
businesses with a low ratio of property to sale.
There are still other weaknesses of the property
tax. Revenues from the property tax have tended to lag
behind the National Income. ^-5 The property tax is so
heavily used that it often cannot yield the increased
revenues needed by school districts when they are desired.
The public school financing systems used in
American schools are characterized by inequities in both
the revenue raising and revenue distribution systems
that are used. Under the present systems used to raise
revenue for school, it has been demonstrated that the
poorest communities very often receive lower quality
educational services as measured by the level of per pupil
expenditures. Communities that have lower needs for
services or where the assessed valuation per pupil is
much higher enjoy higher spending levels for education and
lower tax rates for schools. The present disparities in
local tax burdens and spending levels for public schools
stem from the heavy reliance on the local districts for
the support of schools. In 1969-70, local districts
provided over half of the revenue spent on public educa-
tion while almost all of the money raised locally came
from the local property tax.
puture Dimensions in Educational Finance," p. 9.
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The question of equalization of tax burden
needs to be explored. The progressivi ty or regresslvlty
of the taxes used to support schools Is the critical factor
in determining the equality of the revenue raising side of
the fiscal crisis.
States use a wide variety of methods to raise
money for schools -- the income taxes (personal and corpo-
rate), the sales tax, the property tax, the excise tax,
etc. The progressivi ty and regresslvlty of a state's
school financial structure depends on the state's choice
of taxes. The factors that determine the equity of the
tax system are the portion of revenue provided by the
federal, state and local governments, and the relative
progressivi ty of the taxes used. 16 The National Educa-
tional Finance Project concluded after studying school
tax structures in various states that:
(1) The higher the percentage of state revenue
derived from relatively progressive sources,
the higher the progressivi ty of the tax
s true tur e
;
(2) The higher the percentage of the state's
contribution as compared to local tax
revenue, the higher the progressivi ty of
the tax structure;
(3) The higher the percentage of school reve-
nue provided by federal funds, the higher
the progressivity of a state's school taxa-
tion system. 17
i6Johns, et. al .. Alternative Programs for
Financing Schools , Vol • V , National Educational Finance
Project, 19tl, p. 269.
17ibid.
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Equalized valuation per pupil has been the
measure used to assess a school district's wealth. It
is calculated by dividing the local property tax base by
the number of children attending school in the district.
A district's ability to raise revenue for education is
clearly related to the wealth of the community. 8 The
second determinant in the level of local support of public
education is the school property tax rate. A brief illus-
tration will demonstrate the importance of local wealth
and the school tax rate on expenditures for education.
If town A and town B were of equal size and had an equal
number of children attending school, but town A had twice
the assessed valuation per pupil that town B had, then
town B would have to double its school tax rate to raise
the same amount of revenue for education as town A. Put
another way, if A and B had equal tax rates, then A would
raise twice as much money as B would for schools on a
per pupil basis.
It would seem logical for a legislature to
design a state school financing system so that It rewarded
tax effort. This would mean that higher tax rates would
produce higher levels of spending. The wealth differen-
tials that exist between school districts nullify this
prospect. The actual effect of most state school financing
l8Steven Weiss, Public School Finance and Reform,
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 1970, No. 4o, p. lo.
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schemes Is the opposite. In fact, a consistent pattern
of Increasing spending at decreasing tax rates appears
as one moves from the districts with the lowest per pupil
assessed valuation to the districts with the highest
per pupil assessed valuation. 19 Widespread disparities
in the level of spending per pupil result from the wide
variations in the district’s wealth. ^0
Attempts have been made by states to equalize
the level of spending between districts through the use
of state aid plans. 21 Though state aid programs vary
widely in design and effect, there are two commonly-used
methods to distribute state aid: the foundation plan and
the percentage equalizing plan. The foundation plan,
or the Strayer-Haig formula which is used in over half
of the states, sets a target level at which per pupil
expenditures will be supported by the state. Generally,
a minimum tax rate is required in order to receive the
foundation aid. Unfortunately, foundation plans are
generally set at very low levels. No real equalization
19Ibld
.
,
p. 20.
20See Weiss, Public School Finance , John Coons,
William Clune and Stephen Sugarman, Prlyate~~Wealth and
Public Education, (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 1970), Berfce, "Current Crisis,"
and Serrano v. Priest 5 Cal. 3d 384 (1971).
21por a brief historical analysis of school
finance systems and their equalizing tendencies, see:
Coons, et. al. , Private Wealth. and Public Education .
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takes place because the spending la financed from the
local districts where great disparities in wealth exist.
Foundation plans are often combined with other types of
state aid that neutralize the equalizing impact a founda-
tion plan could have. In most cases, a flat grant is
tied to the foundation plan which actually has an anti-
equalizing effect. 22 See Table 1.
The percentage equalizing plan is used in
about one-third of the states. It is designed to equalize
spending at all levels rather than at just one arbitrary
level. A formula is used to determine the level of aid
to be provided to each district. For example:
i.e., State Aid Ratio =(1- wealth ratio of district "n")
=(1- (assessed valuation per
pupil of district "n")
( assessed valuation of
key district)
If the wealth ratio is established using the richest
district, then the plan eliminates the wealth factor
completely and the same local tax effort will provide
the same level of expenditures regardless of wealth.
The theoretical form is, unfortunately, not used in any
state. Modifications of the plan occur in the political
process which effectively block the operation of the
percentage equalizing plan. There are a number of ways
that this may happen. Most states using the percentage
2
2
Ibid.
, pp. 106-108.
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equalizing plan guarantee a minimum level of state aid
for all districts, regardless of wealth, which has an
an ^i -equali zing effect. A second way to limit the equa-
lization of the percentage grant is to place a ceiling
above which the state will not provide aid. A third way
that a percentage equalizing formula can be subverted
from its intended effect is to refuse to require nega-
tive payments for districts that are wealthier than the
key district used to compute the state aid ratio.
In California, for instance, the flat grant
(called Basic Aid) of $125 per pupil actually widens
the gap between the rich and poor districts. The table
on the next page will help to illustrate this point.
The net impact of the state aid plan, used
with the intention of eliminating the wealth disparities
between school districts, has been significant.
’’Actually, states have succeeded in equalizing neither
tax burdens nor education services. . ." Inequities
in state school financing systems exist because of the
affects of political self-interest and political compro-
mise on the part of state legislators. The legislative
route for changing the present state school financing
23weiss, Publi 0 School , pp. 35-36.
2^Berke and Kelley, Financial Aspects , p. 20.
/
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TABLE 1
REVENUE DISPARITIES IN CALIFORNIA
AND IMPACT OF STATE AIDa
$1200
1100
1000
900
Revenue
Per =
Pupil
BP BP
with without
basic basic
aid aid
1162 $1037
*1037 *1037
Property Tax
Basic Aid
Equalization
Aidmm
Foundations
program minimum
guarantee per
pupil at secon-
dary level
BH BH
with without
basic basic
aid aid
Conclusions:
(1)
Baldwin Park residents taxed themselves at twice the
rate but they were able to raise only l/5 the revenue that
Beverly Hills was able to raise ($203 vs. $1037 per pupil).
(2)
The basic aid grants ($125 per pupil) actually widens
the gap between the rich and poor districts. The basic
aid grant is meaningless to Baldwin Park because the
equalization aid would bring Baldwin Park up to the
foundation's minimum, while the basic aid grant provides
extra revenue for Bevely Hills.
(3)
The flat grant is "Invisible money" to the poor school
districts and might as. well be earmarked for the rich ones.
afhe table is based on 1968-69 Tax and State
Aid figures.
Baldwin Park: Tax Rate-$5.48 per $100 Assessed Valuation.
Tax Base-$3»706 Assessed Valuation per pipil.
Beverly Hills: Tax Rate-$2.38 per $100 Assessed Valuation.
Tax Base-$ 50,885 Assessed Valuation per pupil.
system has been very Ineffective for those reasons,
ihe court system has historically been an avenue for
change sought out by those who were Ineffective in
achieving such changes in the political system. Thus,
the lack of progress in achieving reform of state school
financing systems in the legislature has moved the
struggle to the courts.
The Serrano Decision and Its Progeny
The inequities in school financing systems
described above have already been challenged in the
courts with Mclnnls v. Shapiro 2 ^ and. Buruss v, Wllkerson
,
20
but not successfully until August 31, 1971, when the
Supreme Court of the State of California reached its
decision in Serrano v, priest . 27 The Court declared
California's school financing system unconstitutional on
the grounds that it violated the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution. Since the six-to-one ruling occurred in Califor-
nia, there have been four decisions affirming the Serrano
pQ
principle and one ruling in which a similar suit lost.
2
^McInnls v. Shapiro 293 F. Supp. 327 (1968).
^Buruss y, wilkerson 310 F. Supp. 572 (19o9).
^^Serrano v. Priest 5 Cal. 3d 564 (1971).
2®The decisions that are similar to the one
reached In S errano are: Van Dusartz v. Hatfield (Minnesota
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The California Supreme Court observed that California's
state school funding scheme "Invidiously discriminated
against the poor because It makes the quality of a child's
education a function of the wealth of his parents and
neighbors ." 29 The Court stated that the wide disparities
in spending between the school districts in Los Angeles
were inevitable because of the large differentials in
the taxable wealth of the districts. It also observed
that the state aid that California provided had been
insufficient in bringing about any real equalization of
expenditure levels. The principle that emerged from the
S errano decision was that California's school financing
system must be fiscally neutral. This means that the
level of spending per pupil must be untied from the wealth
of the school district. At least forty-five suits that
are similar in nature to Serrano have been filed in
twenty-seven different states, and states that have not
had suits filed are vulnerable to such suits because of
their reliance on property tax revenues for schools.
The lone exception is Hawaii, which has only one school
district for the whole state.
Rodriguez v. San Antonio (Texas), Robinson v. Cahill (New
Jersey^ and" Hollins v. Shof stall (Arizona) . In a suit
bringing similar charges, the New York Supreme Court of
Westchester (a trial court) rejected the plaintiff s
claims in Spano v. Lakeland School District .
29Serrano v. Priest.
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The S errano decision is not final, however.
It has been remanded to the trial court for further adju-
dication. The other decisions that were generated by the
S errano decision are not final, either. The United States
Supreme Court will make the final decision on the ques-
tions raised in the Serrano decision and the other school
finance decisions. On April 17, 1972, the Texas Education
Agency appealed the Rodriguez v. San Antonio decision
directly to the Supreme Court. On June 6, 1972, the
Supreme Court decided to hear the Rodriguez case. No
decision will be reached until after the October, 1972
session of the Supreme Court begins. No one can predict
the outcome of the decision. If the Rodriguez decision
is affirmed, then the "wealth neutrality principles 1 '
established in S errano will be a requirement of all the
state school financing systems. Many observers of the
Supreme Court feel that the chances of the Rodriguez
decision winning are not good because of the conservative
nature of the Court as now constituted.^ A negative
decision in the Supreme Court would set the struggle for
equality in educational finance for years to come, but
^°See articles by Paul Dimond and Ferdinand
Schoettle for a thorough examination of the legal impli-
cations and ramifications of the Serrano decision and
its progeny. (Paul Dimond, " S errano : A Victory of Sorts
for Ethics, Not Necessarily for Education," Yale Review
of Law and Social Action , February, 1972; and Ferdinand
Schoettle, ''The Equal Protection Clause and Public Educa-
tion," Columbia Law Review, Vol. 71, December, 1971.
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the S errano decision and Its progeny have already Induced
many of the states to re-examine their present methods
financing schools due to the confusion over Its
meaning and potential Impact on the various states.
Even with the tentativeness of the decision,
Serrano Is being compared with the Brown v. Board of
Education decision, concerning its possible Importance
for school and education finance. Taking the financial
crisis of schools as a given and the uncertainty of the
constitutionality of the local property tax that is the
mainstay of most of the states' school financing schemes,
it seems crucial to explore some alternative plans for
state school finance. The alternative school financing
plans to be examined have been constructed so that they
meet the one requirement established in the Serrano
decision: that "the quality of public education may not
be a function of wealth other than the wealth of the
state as a whole.
"
Alternative School Financing flans
There have been a number of alternative plans
proposed as possible legislative remedies to the wealth
discrimination struck down in Serrano . The alternatives
to be explored fall into four categories:
•^Coons, Clune and Sugarman, Private Wealth ,
p • x
.
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I. Pull State Support Plans;
II. Mixed State and Local Support Plans;
III. Federal Support plans;
IV. Cross plan Alternatives. 32
Before the alternative plans are explored in more detail,
the criteria which will be used to evaluate the different
plans will be described.
Criteria for Evaluation
The criteria which will be used to evaluate the
alternative school finance plans fall into four general
categories: (1) legal criteria; (2) financial criteria;
(3) political criteria; (4) educational criteria. The
criteria were designed by the author to cover the impor-
tant issues that must be dealt with in constructing a
new school finance system in a state. The four criteria
will be applied to the alternative school finance plans
described in this chapter, and the evaluations will be
the basis of a recommendation as to the best method for
constructing a state school finance system. The legal and
economic criteria were developed to satisfy the wealth
neutrality principle established in the S errano decision.
The political criteria were structured so that they would
reflect the political questions that must be considered
before a new school finance system can be constructed.
32See John Coons, "School Taxes and Spending
Systems Valid Under Serrano v. Priest ," Lawyers Committee
for Civil Rights Under Law, December, 1971.
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i’he educational criteria were designed to deal with
the crucial questions relating the quality of educational
opportunity to school finance.^-5
The first criterion is that a state's school
finance plan must satisfy the fiscal neutrality principle
established in the 3 errano decision and reaffirmed in
decisions in Minnesota, Texas, New Jersey and Arizona.
This means that variations in the ability of local school
districts to support education must be greatly reduced
or eliminated altogether by the states. The establish-
ment of wealth neutrality as a principle for state school
finance has not been settled finally in the courts, but
it has generally been accepted as the minimum requirement
for any new state school financing system.
A second criterion that is complimentary with
the first is that a state school financing scheme should
equalize the tax burden and as it equalizes the district's
revenue-raising capabilities. Although the 3 errano
decision and its progeny did not speak directly to the
question of equalization of the tax burden, it is a highly
desirable objective. The first two criteria are more
objective while the last two (the political and educational
criteria) tend to be more subjective in nature.
^For further information on criteria for
evaluating state school financing plans, see National
Educational Finance Project , Vol. V, pp. 231-263 and Joh
Silard, "Legislative Options for Achieving ^ucational
Equalization," unpublished paper prepared for the La ye
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law.
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The third criterion to be used in the evaluation
of the alternative school financing plans is the political
acceptability of the different proposals.
. There are two
significant aspects of this criterion. The first is the
issue of local control of public schools. The local sur
tax option will be at the heart of this debate over local
control
. The issue of local con tro 1 wi 11 also be used as
a red shirt by those who wish to protect the economic
advantage of taxpayers and students in wealthier districts.
The second aspect of the political acceptability criterion
relates to the question of the cost of the finance plan.
If any significant equalization of educational spending
is to take place, it will come at the expense of the high-
wealth suburban districts which will have increased their
present rates of taxation and receive less or no state
support. The suburbs generally have the political clout
in the legislature to make or break any of the school
finance plans. It is very unlikely that any state will
initiate a new school financing program that calls for
a significant Increase in the total cost of education for
the state. Politics of implementation is not as simple
as rich districts vs. poor districts. Large numbers of
wealthy people live in poor districts, and conversely,
large numbers of poor people live in rich districts.
Political representation is often cross district, and
i
96
legislators represent more than one district. It is hard
to believe that upper and middle class people living in
low-wealth and middle-wealth districts will desert public
schools that they have historically supported. The rich
and near rich who live in high-wealth districts already
oppose equalization. If these families desert public
education, as many have already, then not much will be
lost.
Sources of support will come from self-interested
school districts below or near the median wealth of the
state. These districts can expect to benefit by success-
ful reform of state school financing systems. Another
important source of political support may come from owners
of industrial and commerical property in school districts
with low wealth. It is questionable whether an alliance
can be formed between residents and businessmen of poor
districts. The political acceptability of the models
will be the crucial factor in determining the type of
legislation that emerges to remedy the present inequities
in the states' school financing systems.
The final criterion is that equal educational
opportunity should bp facilitated by the models. The
term "equal educational opportunity," for the purpose of
this study, means that the variations in educational
needs of the students must be met through the allocations
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of funds. i'he funds should be distributed so as to pro-
vide low-expenditure districts (low taxable wealth districts)
with the means to improve the quality of their educatio-
nal offering. This criterion is the hardest to satisfy,
but it should, in the opinion of the author, be the central
focus of any new school finance legislation that is drafted.
I. Full State Support Plans
Plan IA - Flat Grant Model
Each school district would receive the same
amount of money ('x 1 amount) per pupil to be determined
by the legislature. The flat grant would be set at the
eightieth percentile of per pupil expenditure for the
state. The decision as to how the money would be spent
remains with the local district. The revenue would be
raised by a uniform statewide property tax.
Evaluation of Plan IA
The state will provide an equal flat grant per
pupil to all school districts. The cost of education
would be untied from local wealth by providing all school
districts the same amount of revenue per child. The uni-
form statewide property tax would be an improvement over
the present method of raising school revenue. It would
also equalize the tax burden by setting a standard rate
that all people would pay, but the state property tax,
unfortunately, retains the same regressive features of
any property tax.
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A flat grant financing plan for schools would
not be politically acceptable. No sur tax option exists
to allow the local school districts to augment the spending
level provided by the flat grant. If the flat grant were
set at the eightieth percentile of per pupil expenditure
for the state, It would mean that the top twenty per cent
in per pupil expenditures would be leveled off to the
eightieth percentile. To raise all school districts that
are below the eightieth percentile up to that level would
require an increase of $3.7 billion In state spending for
education with a resulting increase in taxes .
^
The hlgh-
expendlture school districts generally have lower property
tax rates than do the low-expenditure districts which
generally have to tax at higher tax rates to try to
achieve anything near spending parity with the high
wealth districts. ^5 The very school districts which
would be expected to pay higher taxes would have just
suffered a cut in their level of spending per pupil.
The wealthy school districts would certainly not support
such a system for financing schools.
The political stance of the urban school dis-
tricts on such a plan is hard to predict. Many urban
3^See Appendix 0 for the estimated cost of
equalizing school expenditures at the eightieth percen-
tile per pupil and at various other levels by state.
35weiss, Public Schools , p. 20.
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school districts spend as much or more than many suburban
school districts. A number of urban school districts
could be affected adversely by such a plan in terms of
their expenditure levels per pupil. 36 On the tax side,
the affect is Just as questionable. In three quarters of
the large urban centers, a full state assumption of school
costs would mean increased taxes. Major urban cities in
1967 had higher market value of property per pupil than
any other type of school district, including the sururbs.^7
It is conceivable that a number of urban centers would
have increased taxes, but they would be receiving less
money per pupil to spend. There might be a decrease in
the school tax rates for some of the urban school districts,
but most others would be increased.
The political possibility of passing a flat
grant system of financing schools is practically nil.
The wealthy suburban school districts' opposition to such
a plan is insured by the very real possibility of their
having their taxes increased and their expenditure
levels decreased. The support of urban school districts
for full state assumption is questionable at best. The
36fjearly twice as many central cities would
receive lower expenditures from the state under a state-
wide distribution of funds than they presently receive.
See Berke and Kelley, Financial Aspects , p. 66.
37johns, et. al . , Alternatives , p. 91.
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districts rh$t stand to benefit from such a plan through
increased spending and lower tax rates do not have the
political powe- to pass such a plan in the legislature.
If a flat grant was instituted by a state at
the eightieth percentile for per pupil expenditures, it
would provide increased revenue for many districts. This
would allow these districts the option of increasing
teacher salaries, reducing class size, hiring new personnel,
instituting new programs, improving the school facilities,
etc. Unfortunately, increased expenditures have not
effectively demonstrated that increased expenditures per
pupil can improve the quality of the educational perfor-
mance of the students. The flat grant model does not
take into account different types of students and their
different types of educational needs. Even with the
questionableness of the impact of extra dollars on improv-
ing the quality of education, the poor school districts
should have the right to make mistakes with the money.
John Coons, senior author of Private Wealth and Public
Education stated:
If money is Inadequate to improve educations,
the residents of poor districts should at
east have an equal Opportunity
appointed by its failure. 3o
to be dis-
38j 0hn Coons is quoted in "Who Pays the Bills?"
Time, February 7, 1972 , p. 52 .
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n l? “ Flat Grant plus Cost Differentials
The state would provide each school district
with equal flat grants per pupil set at the eightieth
percentile with the addition of categorical aid for cost
differentials. The cost differentials might include
transportation costs, cost of living differences, and a
municipal overburden factor. The school districts would
retain the right to decide how the money would be alloca-
ted. The tax revenue would be raised by a uniform state-
wide property tax. 39
Evaluation of Plan IB
The state will provide an equal flat grant per
pupil to all school districts with the addition of cate-
gorical aid for transportation costs, cost of living
differentials, and for municipal overburden. The cost
of education would be untied from local wealth by provi-
ding all school districts with the same amount of revenue
per child. The uniform statewide property tax would be
an improvement over the present method of raising school
revenue. It would also equalize the tax burden by setting
a standard rate that all people would pay, but the state-
wide property tax retains the same regressive features
of any property tax.
39s ee Who Should Pay for Public Schools ,
(Washington, D.C.
:
Advisory commission on Intergovern-
mental Relations, 1971)
•
102
A flat grant with the addition of categorical
aid would not be politically acceptable. No sur tax option
exists to allow the local school districts to augment
their spending level provided by the flat grant and cate-
gorical aid. If the flat grant level were set at the
eightieth percentile of per pupil expenditure for the
state, it would mean that the top twenty per cent in per
pupil expenditures would be leveled off to the eightieth
percentile. To raise all the districts below the eightieth
percentile up to that level would require a significant
increase in state spending for education with a resulting
increase in taxes. The big expenditure districts generally
have lower property tax rates than do the low expenditure
districts which generally have to tax at higher tax rates
to try to achieve anything near spending parity with the
high wealth school districts.^ The very districts which
would be expected to pay higher taxes would have Just
suffered a cut in their level of spending per pupil.
The wealthy districts would certainly not support such a
system of financing schools.
The political stance of the urban school dis-
tricts on such a plan is hard to project. Many urban
school districts spend as much or more than many suburban
^°See Footnote 3^.
^See Footnote 35.
103
school districts. So a number of urban school districts
could be affected adversely by such a plan in terms of
their expenditure levels per pupil. 42 On the tax side,
the affect is just as questionable. Major urban core
cities in 1967 had higher market value of property per
pupil than any other type of school district, Including
the suburbs. 45 There might be a decrease in the school
tax rates for some of the urban school districts while
others may be increased. A municipal overburden factor
would make the plan more attractive to urban centers, but
just how much would be determined by the size of the
factor.
The political possibility of passing a flat
grant system of financing schools (even with the addition
of categorical aid) is not good. The wealthy suburban
school districts' opposition to such a plan is insured
by the very real possibility of having taxes increased
and expenditure levels decreased. The support of urban
school districts is questionable at best, but the muni-
cipal overburden would make the distribution side of the
plan more attractive. The districts that stand to bene-
fit from such a plan through increased spending and lower
tax rates do not have the political power to pass such
a plan in the legislature.
42See Footnote 36.
43see Footnote 37.
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If a flat grant was Instituted by a state at
the eightieth percentile for per pupil expenditures In
the state, It would provide Increased revenue for many
districts. This would allow these districts the option
of Increasing teacher salaries, reducing class size,
hiring new personnel, instituting new programs, improving
the school facilities, etc. Increased expenditures have
yet to demonstrate that the extra money can improve the
quality of the educational performance of the students.
The flat grant model does not take into account different
types of students and their different types of educational
needs. Even with the questionableness of the impact of
extra spending on improving the quality of education,
poor school districts should have the right to be dis-
appointed by the failure of increased spending to improve
the educational quality.
Plan IC - Plat Grant with Cost Differentials plus
Dollar preferences for Educating Different
Types of Students
Each school district would receive a flat
grant per pupil plus categorical aid as in Model IB.
Weighting as to cost differentials of educating different
types of students would be taken into account in this
model. See Table 2 . Each school district would retain
local control over curriculum and personnel decisions.
The state would raise the revenue by the use of a uniform
statewide property tax. The local districts would not
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be allowed to supplement per pupil expenditure levels
supplied by the state.
TABLE 2
STUDENT WEIGHTING INDEX
Educational Program Weighting
1. Basic elementary grades 1-6 1.00
2. Grades 7-9 1.20
3. Grades 10-12 1.40
4. Physidally handicapped 3.25
5. Compensatory education 2.00
6. Vocational education 1.80
Source: Johns, et. al .~ Alternative Programs for Finan-
cing Schools
,
Vol. V, 1971, p. 269.
Evaluation of Plan IC
The state will provide an equal flat grant per
pupil with cost differentials to all school districts with
the addition of dollar preferences for educating students
with different educational needs. The cost of education
would be untied from local wealth by providing all school
districts the same amount of revenue per child. The
uniform statewide property tax would be an improvement
over the present method of raising school revenue. It
would also equalize the tax burden by setting a standard
rate that all people would pay, but the statewide property
tax retains the same regressive features of any property
tax.
A flat grant with the categorical aid and stu-
dent preference weighting would not likely be politically
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acceptable. No sur tax option exists to allow the local
school districts to augment their spending level provided
by the flat grant or the additional and provided by the
state. If the flat grant level were set at the eightieth
percentile of per pupil expenditure for the state, it
would mean that the top twenty per cent in per pupil
expenditures would be leveled off to the eightieth per-
centile. To raise all the districts below the eightieth
percentile to that level would require a significant
increase in state spending for education with a resulting
increase in taxes.^ The high-expenditure districts
generally have lower property tax rates than do the low-
expenditure districts that generally have to tax at
higher tax rates to try to achieve anything near spending
parity with the high wealth school districts. The
very districts that would have had their taxes increased
would have just suffered a cut in the level of spending
per pupil in their district. The wealthy districts
would certainly not support such a system of financing
schools
.
The political stance of the urban school dis-
tricts on such a plan is hard to project. Many urban
school districts spend as much or more than many suburban
school districts. So a number of urban school districts
^See Footnote 34.
^^See Footnote 35.
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could be affected adversely by such a plan In terras of
their expenditure levels per pupil. ^6 on the tax side,
the affect is Just as questionable. A large number of
the largest school districts in urban areas would be
forced to raise taxes if this plan were instituted.
Major urban core cities in 1967 had higher market value
of property per pupil than any other type of school dis-
trict, including the suburbs .
^
There might be a decrease
in the school tax rates for some of the urban school dis-
tricts while others may be increased, and the affect on
per pupil expenditures is Just as questionable.
The political possibility of passing a flat
grant system of financing would be improved by the addi-
tion of the spending according to weighted students.
The wealthy suburban school districts' opposition to
such a plan is insured by the very real possibility of
having taxes increase and expenditure levels decrease.
Though the urban districts stand to gain more than the
suburban districts because of the student weighting,
their political support would be tentative based on the
level of student weighting. If the municipal overburden
factor was adequate in the categorical aid, this would be
another political plus as far as urban districts are
^6$ee pootnote 36.
^7see Footnote 37.
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concerned. j'he districts that stand to benefit from
such a plan through increased spending and lower tax
rates do not have the political power to pass such a
plan in the legislature, but the flat grant with the
addition of student dollar preferences would stand a
better chance than the other flat grant plans.
If a flat grant was instituted by a state at
the eightieth percentile for per pupil expenditures in
the state, it would provide increased revenue for many
districts. This would allow these districts the option
of increasing teacher salaries, reducing class size,
hiring new personnel, instituting new programs, improving
the school facilities, etc. Unfortunately, Increased
expenditures have yet to demonstrate that the extra money
can improve the quality of educational performance of
the students. The flat grant model with the addition of
student weighting does take into account the (educational
needs) different types of students. Even with the ques-
tionableness of the Impact of extra dollars on improving
the quality of education, the poor school districts
should have the right to be disappointed by its failure
to Increase the quality of education for its students.
i’he allocation of school revenue on the basis
of weighted students would be a significant educational
Improvement over the straight flat grant plan or the flat
grant plan with categorical aid. It would not likely
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increase the political attractiveness of the flat grant
plan enough to make it a real political possibility,
xhe New York State Commission on the Quality, Cost and
Financing of elementary and Secondary Education has
recommended a similar plan with some modifications. 48
The reaction to the Commission's plan has been cool in
the legislature, and chances for passage in its recommen-
ded form seem very small.
II. Mixed State and Local Support Plans
Plan IIA - District Power Equalized Plan
The tax ability of each district within the
state would be equalized at any given tax rate option.
The districts could then choose at what tax rate they
wanted to place themselves and thus decide the amount
of money spent on each pupil. If a district did not
raise the designated amount of money at the given rate,
the state would provide the extra money to raise it to
the stipulated level. If a school district raised more
money than the stipulated amount, then the extra money
would be given to the state to redistribute to communities
with lower tax bases. See i'able 3. The local school
districts would keep the right to decide its tax rate
48Report of the New York State Commission on
the Quality. Cost~and Financing of Elementary and Secon-
dary Education^ Vol. I, 19Y2.
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and expenditure per pupil on the basis of the chart in
Table 3. The ability to raise money has to be equalized
b,y the state. All other school districts* functions
would remain the same.
TABLE 3
DISTRICT POWER-EQUALIZING
Expenditure
Tax Rate Per Pupil
2 mills per $100 assessed valuation $600
2.5 " $700
3.0 " $800
3.5 " $900
4.0 " $ 1,000
4.5 " $1,100
5.0 " $ 1,200
5.5 " $1,300
Note: This chart was designed by the author for illustra-
tive purposes only. It was not intended for actual
implementation.
Evaluation of Plan IIA
A district power equalized model would meet
the wealth neutrality test by equalizing the ability of
each school district within a state to raise tax revenue.
The tax rate for any chosen level of spending would be
equalized. If District A chose to spend at $900 per
pupil, it would tax at the 3.5 mills per $100. The same
would hold true for any other district choosing the $900
per pupil expenditure level. The local district would be
allowed to chcose its level of spending per pupil. It
would be at or above a state set minimum and at or below
Ill
a state set maximum. By choosing the expenditure level,
the school district determines Its school tax rate.
This aspect of the district power equalizing plan serves
the same function as the local sur tax option, but the
plan has a strong political weakness.
This weakness results from the revenue recap-
ture feature which affects the wealthy districts. Assume
that District A chooses to spend $1,300 per pupil at a
tax rate of 5.5 mills per $100 assessed valuation. If
the district actually raised $2,000 at that tax rate, it
would be obliged to surrender the $700 per pupil that it
collected over the $1,300 figure to the state for redis-
tribution to districts that do not raise enough revenue
at their chosen tax rate. ^9
The reason for the minimum expenditure level
is to protect against districts that will not choose to
spend an adequate amount of money on education. The
maximum rate is necessary to protect the state's budget. 5°
If no limit were set, the poor districts might choose
high levels of spending and taxation while they would not
4?A possible implication may be that district
power-equalizing for school finance might enable some rich
"unburdened" districts to Join the others in not being
able to tax for schools in accord with their "real" pre-
ferences and would free some poor districts to express
a preference in the rate of their school tax.
50jj ew York Qommlsslon, p. 2.45.
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raise the needed money which the state would be required
to supply. Therefore, the state would have to make up
the difference and run the risk of a huge deficit if a
maximum expenditure level were not set. In all likelihood,
there would be a significant increase in state expendi-
tures because the maximum would have to be set at a
level near the top percentile of expenditures for the
state. This would allow property-poor school districts
to increase their expenditures while keeping their tax
rates the same or by decreasing them. The possibility
of a district power equalized system of school financing
passing in a state legislature is small. The revenue
recapture feature would make the plan politically unaccep-
table to wealthy districts. The real possibility of
significant increases in state education expenditures is
another political liability. The district power equali-
zation plan has the refinements of categorical aid and
student weighting. These features would improve the
plan, but it is not enough to make it politically accep-
table. ^
Educationally, a district power equalizing plan
would provide poor school districts the chance to spend
additional money on education, assuming that they could
5l3ee Coons, Clune and Sugarman, Private Wealth ,
pp, 273-283, for an analysis of the politics of a
power
equalized system.
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maintain their present high tax rates. JL'his would give
them a chance to raise teachers' salaries, cut class size,
hire new personnel, etc.
,
but this plan, in reality, only
equalizes dollars rather than Improve education or learning.
Poor districts should have as much to spend on education
as wealthy districts, but the quality of a child's educa-
tion should no more be the function of his neighbor's
value of education than of his wealth.
Plan IIB - Flat Grant Plus a Limited Local Sur Tax Option
The state would provide a flat grant per pupil,
and it would also allow each district to raise an addi-
tional amount of money from local tax revenue. The add-
on would have to be power equalized for this model to be
constitutional under the S errano decision, but a signi-
ficant narrowing of the spending differential might be
acceptable to the court. State revenue would be raised
by a uniform statewide property tax.
Evaluation of Plan IIB
A fiat grant with a power equalized local
sur tax option allowed at the local level would untie
the cost of education from local wealth. The tax burden
would be equalized because the tax rate would be uniform
for all, but the statewide property tax retains the
regressive feature of any property tax.
The plan's political acceptability is enhanced
greatly by the addition of the local sur tax option.
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ihe sur tax option, even when power equalized, provides
wealthier communities a better opportunity to supplement
school spending because of the favored economic position.
Even facing the possibility of a higher property tax
rate, the wealthier community will be more likely to use
the sur tax option. Cities faced with a heavy municipal
overburden factor will have a much harder time raising
extra tax revenue through a sur tax option because of their
already strained tax rates. 52 This same phenomena can
be expected to hold true for poor school districts, too.
If this plan were instituted and funded at the
eightieth percentile, it would take a significant increase
in state spending and, thus, state taxes to provide the
additional #3*7 billion necessary to bring all those
school districts below the eightieth percentile mark up
52"Michelson and Grubb have begun to undertake
this task by examining the interrelationship among many
variables including school tax rates, non-education tax
rates, local school revenue per pupil, local revenue for
non-education purposes, property valuation, state school
aid, federal school aid, mean faculty income, average
daily attendance, children from low income families and
population. Their work suggests many interesting inter-
relationships, causes and effects. One of their most
interesting conclusions is that 'non-educational spending
is, by and large, determined by factors beyond the control^
of communities, and tends not to be subject to discretion.'
Educational spending, on the other hand, is more constrained
by the availability of fiscal resources. The school tax
rate will be lowered if non-educational requirements are
high in burdened communities, while the non-education
rate is not similarly affected by a high school tax rate."
Excerpt from Paul Eimond, ''Serrano: A Victory of Sorts for
Ethics, Not Necessarily for Education," Yale Review of
Law and Social Action, Vol. II, No. 2, Winter 1971, p. 1^0.
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to it across the nation. This would detract from its
political acceptability, but in general, this plan, with
any of the modifications from Plan I (Categorical Aid
and Student Weighting) is the best political possibility,
ihis is so because it is the plan that resembles the
present way most states are financing schools. It offers
the wealthy districts the opportunity to supplement the
flat grants through a local sur tax add on.
The quality of the educational offering could
possibly be raised because of the increased revenue
most districts would be receiving. Districts that were
receiving extra dollars could Increase teacher salaries,
cut class size, hire new personnel, institute new prog-
rams, etc. The plan could be designed to include cate-
gorical aid and student weighting which would increase its
attractiveness both politically and educationally. Given
the questionableness of the impact of extra dollars on
the quality of education, the poor districts should be
granted the right to spend equal amounts of money per
pupil as the wealthy districts do, no matter what the
affect of the additional spending.
III. Federal Support Models
Plan III A - Federal Revenue Sharing^
Federal revenue is distributed to the states
53xhis plan was taken from the National Educa-
tional Finance Project, Vol. V, p. 209 .
116
on the basis of population with the requirement that
a fixed percentage (40 per cent) of those funds be allo-
cated to public education. If the federal revenue to be
shared were set at 018 billion with a minimum of 40 per
cent being allocated for education, then 07.2 billion, or
approximately 20 per cent of the present level of state
and local expenditures, would be allocated by the states
for education.
Evaluation of plan IIIA
A federal revenue sharing plan by itself would
not satisfy the wealth neutrality principle established
in the S errano decision unless it was designed to replace
the local share of public school support. For a federal
revenue sharing plan to do this, it would take over 018
billion or 100 per cent of the stipulated federal revenue
to be shared. 5^ if the revenue provided by the federal
government did replace the revenue supplied by the local
property tax, it would significantly equalize the tax
burden on the local taxpayer. The federal tax structure
is more progressive than either the state or local tax
structures which tend to be more regressive. 55
A federal revenue sharing plan could have no
54j?or a revenue sharing plan to be effective,
it should supply between 22 to 30 per cent of the revenue
for public schools. Johns, et. al . , Alternatives , Vol . V»
pp. 208-209.
5 5ibid. , pp. 193-229.
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Impact on the sur tax option which is a state responsibi-
lity. A revenue sharing plan similar to this one seems
to have a chance of passing Congress this year. The states
are likely to welcome whatever tax relief this would bring
since local expenses have increased twelvefold from $11
billion to over $132 billion in the past twenty-five
years, while federal expenses have climbed at less than
one-third of that rate. 56
Federal revenue sharing, if it simply turned
$7.2 billion or $18 billion over to the states for distri-
bution with no requirement for changes in the present
method states finance schools and distribute revenue
to schools, would bring about little equalization. The
design of the revenue sharing plan and the requirements
for change of the present systems of financing schools
will determine the equalization of expenditures. Another
way for the federal government to improve the fiscal
position of the states for supporting public schools
would be to remove welfare costs from the state. Accord-
ing to the Flelschman Commission Report
,
Bill HR1, which
is pending in Congress, would pay for about one-thir ti eth
of New York's welfare cost. 57 This would be a supplemen-
tal move, but in itself is not enough to ease the educa-
tional burden of the states. A complete takeover of welfare
56Report of the New York State Commission , pp.
3.09-3.10.
5^1 bid.
,
p. 3.12.
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by the federal government would be a significant step
in the right direction for federal aid. The consequences
for the quality of education are hard to predict given
the numerous ways of designing the federal revenue
sharing plan. 5$
flan IIIB - National Foundation Plan
A national foundation level would be established
which the state and federal governments would guarantee
to every school district on a per pupil basis. The
federal government would provide $12 billion of the support
and the state governments would provide the rest of the
money to support public education. 59 The federal revenue
would be raised by a value-added tax. The plan would be
designed to encourage states to adopt some form of a
full state funding plan to finance schools.
Evaluation of Plan IIIB
A national foundation program supported by the
federal and state governments would satisfy the wealth
neutrality test by removing the local districts' wealth
as a factor in the support of public education. Relief
from the local property tax would help equalize the tax
burden, but if the federal support came from a value-
added tax (a form of a national sales tax), it would
58johns, et. al. , Alternatives , Vol. V, pp.
208 -209 .
59see Footnote 46 .
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merely mean a switch from one regressive tax to another. 60
If federal funds were provided out of Income tax revenues,
a significant equalization of tax burden would take place.
Spending would be equalized for all districts within
each state.
Ihe question of local control of schools would
be at the heart of the political debate on this plan.
The increased federal support and loss of local support
of schools would indicate a sharp decline in local control.
There would be no sur tax option under this plan, but
one could be added without much difficulty as long as
it were power equalized. The states would have to have
the opportunity to increase their share of support for
education relative to the federal support to satisfy the
high expenditure states. Assuming that this condition is
met, the states would have to set their level of support
at a high enough level to satisfy the wealthy districts
within the states. This could mean a significant increase
in state aid with a resultant increase in state taxes
which would be politically unacceptable. If, In fact,
the state did accept this plan and set a high level of
per pupil support, the low wealth districts would have an
6°Franlc Fowlkes, "Administration Leans to Value-
Added Tax to Help Solve National Fiscal Crisis, : Natl onal
Journal, February 5, 1972. For a good analysis. of Impact
of the value-added tax, see pp. 210-219.
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increase in revenue to support their schools. This would
allow a number of districts below the established founda-
tion level the option of spending increased revenue on
Increased teacher salaries, cutting the class size,
hiring new personnel, instituting new programs, etc.
f he national foundation plan was not designed to allocate
revenue on the basis of student weighting, but this adap-
tation could be included at the state level.
Plan IIIC - The National .Education Trust^l
A National Education Trust would be created to
finance portions of education at all levels - pre-school,
elementary and secondary education, college, adult educa-
tion, and manpower retraining. The fund would pay for
the direct cost of schooling (tuition, books, etc.), but
not school construction. i’he people who received the
benefit of support for their education from the National
Education Trust would have to replenish the fund through
an income tax surcharge. The surcharge would vary in
its rate, depending on the income on a progressive scale.
The costs of schooling would be repaid over a person's
working years. The National Education Trust would provide
ninety per cent of the support of pre-school education,
6^This plan was designed by Governor Milton
Shapp and his staff in Pennsylvania, and it was presented
at the N.E.S.D.E.C. Conference on School Finance at
Harvard University on January 8, 1972.
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fifty per cent of the support for elementary and secon-
dary education (the rest coining from the state), and
ninety per cent of the college costs. It would also
provide more lor adult education and manpower retraining.
It is assumed that state support of education will con-
tinue at the present level with federal revenues replacing
those previously provided locally.
Evaluation of flan IIIC
A National Education Trust would meet the
wealth neutrality principle established in the Serrano
decision. By providing federal revenue instead of local
revenue for the support of the public education, the
cost of education would be effectively removed from the
local level. The Trust would supply fifty per cent of
the cost of elementary and secondary education by absor-
bing the local district's financial responsibilities and
the state would provide the other half of the revenue for
public schools at the elementary and secondary level.
The tax burden would be equalized significantly since the
federal funds would come from a progressive income tax
surcharge, and the state tax source would be more equi-
table than the present local property tax system. The
state's share of expenses would rise slightly, from
41 per cent to 50 per cent on the average, but probably
6
^
Digest 1970
, p . 5 1
•
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not enough to make the plan politically unacceptable
because of Increased expenses. The Congressional poli-
tics involved in the passage of the National Education
Trust are very hard to predict because of the newness
of the proposal.
The issue of local control of education would
be at the heart of the debate over the National Education
Trust. A system would have to be designed that allowed
policy decision-making for the school districts to con-
tinue at the local level while the financing of the
schools was handled at the state and national levels.
There is no sur tax option available for local school
districts to supplement school expenditures. The rela-
tionship between the state's and the federal government's
role in education would certainly be a key issue as far
as the states are concerned. The Trust would have to
be designed to allow local decision making to continue
and to allow the state's role in education to be solidi-
fied before it would be politically acceptable at these
levels.
Per pupil expenditures would be equalized
with poor districts receiving additional revenue to
spend. Poor districts could use the additional revenue
they received to increase teacher salaries, cut class
size, hire new personnel, add new programs, etc. Whether
123
or not the additional per pupil expenditures will improve
the quality of education for students in poor districts
is certainly debatable, but poor districts should have
the same right to experience the potential disappointment
of increased expenditures as the wealthy districts do.
IV. Cross Model Alternatives
Plan IVA - Educational Vouchers^
The family would receive an educational voucher
for the full cost of each child's education. Schools
could neither charge extra tuition nor receive private
grants or gifts. Underachievers would be given additional
money for their education. Admission to schools would be
handled by random selection of all the applicants so
that schools could not selectively exclude or include
certain groups of students. A voucher plan could be
financed by any of the plans described in Plans I -III.
Evaluation of Plan IVA
An educational voucher system could be financed
by any of the methods described in the proceeding plans
(I-III). a voucher system would provide each student
with an equal grant (or it could be constructed on a
weighted student basis) which would satisfy the Serrano
^Christopher Jencks, e t . al . , Educational
Vouchers: A Preliminary Report on Financ ing Education
TTv~
rPa v:ments to Parents , (Harvard: CenterTor the Study
of Public Policy, 1$?(5 )
.
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wealth neutrality principle by utilizing the cost of
education from local wealth. The extent of tax burden
equalization would depend on the tax plan that was adop-
ted to supply revenue for the voucher system.
An educational voucher plan is not likely to be
politically acceptable for a number of reasons. No sur
tax add on would be allowed (in this case, no family
supplementation would be allowed). If families were
allowed to add on extra dollars to the voucher grant,
then the cost of education would be truly related to
wealth.
Vouchers could only be used in public schools
and private schools that agreed to accept the voucher
as tuition while making no other charges for the cost
of a child's education. Religious schools pose a tough
question. If they agreed to accept any student that
applied and did not charge extra tuition, would they be
allowed to participate? Only the courts can answer that
question at this time. As for private schools that
charged in excess of the voucher, they would exist as
private schools do today with no state support.
A number of interest groups would oppose the
implementation of an educational voucher system on a
large scale. Teachers’ unions and administrators' organi
zations would certainly resist any plan that allowed the
creation of large numbers of alternative schools. Any
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real threat to the Jobs of these groups would surely
result In their attempt to block such a plan.
A voucher plan that provided for open enroll-
ment and random selection of students In urban and subur-
ban areas would pose a possible threat to the patterns
of segregation in the North. Thus, a voucher plan can
be expected to draw strong opposition from the white
majority if the segregated school patterns are really
threatened. If a voucher plan were implemented, it
might cause an exodus of white students to private
schools, if real integration seemed possible. Thus,
there are a number of strong political reasons why an
educational voucher system is very unlikely to be politi-
cally acceptable on a large scale. Three school districts
have completed feasibility studies on the possibility
of Implementing an educational voucher system (Seattle,
Alum Rock, California and San Francisco) , but none of
the school districts have actually initiated a voucher
plan, and none of them are considering the use of vouchers
on a large scale.
^
A voucher system could be designed to provide
money according to student needs ( on a weighted student
basis). If extra money was provided to underacheivers
,
^"Voucher plan May Be Tested," New Yor k Times,
January 10, 1972, p. E^.
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It might encourage schools to compete Tor underachl evers
because of the extra money incentive, and hopefully, use
the extra money to try to Improve the program. A voucher
plan would encourage the development of a number of alter-
native schools which might improve the quality of educa-
tion for poor districts. If student selection was done
on a random basis, it would provide the opportunity for
the mixing of social classes and the races in schools
which could Improve educational opportunities for the poor
and minority students.
Plan IVB - School District Reorganization
A school district reorganization plan might
call for the following: (1) consolidation of small,
high cost districts; (2) regionalization of high cost
educational services (i.e. vocational education, trans-
portation, data processing and other special services)
;
(3) metropoli tani zing school districts to equalize the
tax bases of the districts. A school district reorgani-
zation plan could be financed by any of the methods
described in plans I-III.
Evaluation of Plan IVB
A school district reorganization plan that
created school districts with approximately equal assessed
valuations per pupil would probably satisfy the wealth
neutrality principle established in the ^ errano decision.
This affect could be accomplished by consolidation oi
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small districts, regionalization of other districts, or
m e tropolitanlzation of urban school districts depending
on the geography, population and wealth of the different
areas. Different types of school organization could also
be funded by any of the methods described in Plans 1-m.
The amount of tax burden equalization would depend on
the method of taxation that was used.
The political acceptability of any of the school
district reorganization plans will be a hard problem.
Consolidating small high cost school districts runs head
on into the issue of local control. Many inefficient
high cost school districts would rather retain their
local control over education than garner the economic
and educational benefits of consolidation. The two most
obvious benefits are the lower cost of the school program
and the ability of a larger school district to offer a
wider variety of education programs for the children.
As a historical trend, school district consolidation has
been occurring rapidly without much encouragement irom
the states. In 1948, there were 95,000 school districts,
and by 1970, there were only 18,000 in the United States,
but there are still far too many high cost districts
that need consolidating. ^5
state aid
few states
reorgani ze
65Little is known about the relationship oi
distribution and district organization, and
are doing anything to encourage districts to
.
See Johns, et. al . , Alternatives , pp. 103- 3
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A metropolitan school district that was designed
to erase the suburban tax privileges and equalize the
tax base will run into opposition for two key reasons.
The first is financial. The suburbs are not likely to
give up the very tax and educational privileges they
have had for so long without a hard political struggle.
The second reason is that a metropolitan school district
would create the strong possibility of school integration
after the many gerrymandered school district lines were
redrawn. It has been effectively demonstrated in Detroit,
Michigan and Richmond, Virginia, that any district reorgani-
zation to achieve integration must include the suburbs. 66
The bussing issue has gone a long way in creating more
division in this country, and any metropolitan plan will
certainly involve the bussing issue. The likelihood of
any metropolitan school district emerging in the United
States is very unlikely without a court order, and the
possibility of a federal district court order to consoli-
date schools for integration is not likely to be upheld
in the Supreme Court.
66 See Bradley v. Mllllken , F. Supp.
October 4, 1971 and Bradley v. City School Board of
Richmond, F. Supp. , January 10\ 197?, Tor in-
formation on court-ordered integration involving the
surrounding suburban school districts. On June 7» 1972,
the U.S. Court of Appeals overturned the federal district
court order for the formation of one large school
district in Richmond involving the suburban districts.
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An effective school district reorganization
plan has the potential to cut expenses for high cost
districts by consolidating costs for transportation,
vocational education and other specialized services.
School district consolidation of small, inefficient
districts would allow for the expansion of the variety
of school programs that a larger school district can
provide for its students. A district reorganization
plan that was designed to encourage social and racial
integration would be an important step in the right
direction for improving education, if not qualitatively,
at least humanely. A district reorganization plan that
was financed by any of the methods in Plans I-III would
have the additional benefits and problems that accrue
from the type of plan used to finance the schools.
Summary
The list of alternative plans for financing
schools that were described and evaluated are by no
means exhaustive. Many variations of the plans which
were described exist and are available to be added to
any state's school financing system. The S errano
decision and its progeny have served as catalysts, and
many state legislatures have started to reevaluate
their
present methods of financing schools because ot the
decisions. The principal reaction to the o erra
n
o
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decision so far has been for the states to create commis-
sions to reexamine present methods used in financing
education. The exact meaning of the S errano decision is
not known, but it is clear that the cost of education
must be untied from wealth of the individual or the local
district. The Supreme Court will decide the ultimate fate
of the wealth neutrality principle when it hears the
Rodriguez case during its next session in October, 1972.
If the recent school finance decisions are upheld in the
Supreme Court, then an important step will have been
taken in the solution to the school finance crisis.
Joel Berke, a noted school finance expert, obser-
ved that the public education fiscal crisis was charac-
terized by:
... a failure to raise adequate revenues through
equitable means, and second, an inability to alio- ,
cate revenues in an efficient and equitable manner.
Before the fiscal crisis facing education will be remedied,
both sides of the crisis will have to be eliminated.
The school finance crisis is not likely to be rectified
quickly, but the recent school finance court decisions
have provided the stimulus necessary to potentially
speed progress in the solution of the school finance
crisis
.
6?Berke, "Current Crisis," p. 2.
CHAPTER V
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
After evaluating the various alternative school
financing plans, the author has concluded that a full-
state funding plan is the best solution to the present
inequities that exist in school finance. A full-state
assumption of public school costs would remove school
district wealth as the determining factor in school
spending and would allow the state to determine how
funds were distributed to the districts. A full-state
funding plan would equalize the tax burden. A progressive
income tax would be the most equitable way to raise
money for schools, but the states are not likely to forego
the productive property tax as a source of revenue for
schools. A uniform statewide property tax is the form
of taxation which will emerge in most states that do
restructure their school financing systems.
^
For changes to occur in most state educational
financing systems, a court order will be needed. State
^The Fleischman Commission in New York State,
Arthur Wise in Maryland, Governor Milliken in Michigan
and California Assembly Bill No. 1406 (April 6 , 1971)
all have recommended uniform statewide property taxes
o
finance education in those states. Hawaii, which as
full-state funding plan, has a statewide property ta .
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legislatures have historically demonstrated an unwilling-
ness to create school finance systems that distribute
state aid in a way which equalizes spending disparities
between school districts. Opposition for any system
that equalizes educational spending can be expected from
high-expenditure districts and most urban districts.
Both types of districts stand to have their expenditure
levels frozen or cut, and both stand to have their school
tax rates increased. For this reason, the author feels
that only a victory in the U.S. Supreme Court for Rodriguez
v. San Antonio
.
2 or state constitutional victories similar
to the one in New Jersey, will lead to the reform of
state school financing schemes.
A full-state funding plan would provide low-
expenditure districts with increased revenue to spend on
education. The questionable impact of increased spending
on educational achievement, demonstrated in the Coleman
Report and other studies, is no excuse not to provide
the increased revenue to poor districts.-^ As John Coons
argued, the poor districts have the same right to be
disappointed by the failure of increased spending on
schools to increase educational achievement as the wealthy
districts are. To the author, it is as much a matter of
2Rodrlguez v. San Antonio 40 Law Week 2398 (1972).
^See Footnote 33 in Chapter I, p. 24.
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political and social equity as it is of educational equity.
If a society selectively spends less on poor and minority
students' education than on wealthy students, it clearly
indicates that the society is not committed to mating the
schools an avenue for social and economic advancement.
A full-state funding plan would help remedy the inequities
in spending between districts, and hopefully within districts.
Poor districts could choose a variety of ways to
spend their new funds, such as: to Increase teacher
salaries, to reduce the pupil-teacher ratio, to buy new
instructional materials, or to improve facilities. Whether
increased spending will improve the educational achieve-
ment is questionable, but as a question of political and
social equality, equalizing spending per pupil between
districts is an important step. A full-state funding plan
would be able to remedy the inequalities in spending between
districts.
To remedy per pupil spending disparities between
states will take a significant increase in federal aid.
A full-state funding plan coupled with a federal revenue
sharing plan or federal assumption of welfare costs would
help to equalize spending disparities between states.
Pull-State Funding Reexamined
The concept of full-state funding of educational
costs has become common vocabulary since the advent of
134
the constitutional attacks on Btate school financing
plans. James Conant Is credited with becoming the first
educator In recent times to advocate full-state assumption
of educational costs. In 1968, he advocated full-state
funding with the stipulation that the local school districts
retain their policy-making and personnel functions.^
Conant recommended that the local property tax be completely
eliminated as a financial support for education and in Its
place would be substituted a statewide property tax.
Since Conant made his proposal in 1968, it has
gained support In a number of quarters. In 1969, the
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, a
bi-partisan intergovernmental agency representing federal,
state and local branches of government, recommended full-
state assumption of "substantially all funding for public
elementary and secondary schools." 5 on the basis of a
statewide task force report on school finance in 1969,
Governor William Milliken of Michigan recommended a consti-
tutional amendment virtually eliminating the use of local
property tax in financing schools and full-state assumption
4stephen Weiss, Existing Disparities in Public
School Finance and Proposals for Reform , ( Boston : Federal
Reserve Bank, 1970
j
,
p. Bo.
^Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations, State Aid to Local Governments , Washington,
D.C., 1969, p. I.
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of the costs of education. 6 Legislation was proposed
in California, before the S errano decision had been
reached, which advocated state assumption of most of the
school costs financed by a uniform statewide property tax
with a limited local sur tax option. 7 in iate 1971,
the Fleischman Commission in New York State recommended
full-state assumption of schools and the Imposition of a
uniform statewide property tax after an extensive study. 6
In March of 1972, the President's Task Force on School
Finance called for state governments to assume the current
costs of local support for education over a five-year
period.
9
There appears to be widely-based support for
full-state assumption of public educational costs. With
the added inducement of a possible constitutional mandate
for school financing reform, why are the states not adopt-
ing such plans? There are a number of objections to full-
state assumption of public school costs.
6An Update of Education Reform in Michigan ,
Office of planning Coordination, October 197^, Technical
Report 1-12, p. 7.
?See California Assembly Bill No. 1406, May 5>
1971.
^See The Report of the New York State Commission
on the Quality, . Cost and Financing of Elementary and Secon -
dary Education , Vol. I, 1972.
9"state Funding Was Recommended by presidential
Commission,'' Wall St. Journal, March 7, 1972, p. 1.
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The primary argument against full-state funding
Is the belief that the local school districts will lose
control of the educational process by giving up control
of the purse strings
.
10 Actually, there Is little evidence
to support this argument, The experience of states (or
Provinces) that have fully assumed the costs of education
or nearly all the costs of education have indicated that
local control has not been hindered by the loss of local
control over the purse strings. In Hawaii, which has a
centralized decision-making process, a uniform salary
schedule for teachers in the state and an equal per pupil
spending level, it has been found that the system " easily
includes local administrative decision making .” 11 In
Delaware and North Carolina, each allows strong, local
administrative control in conjunction with a highly-
centralized state financing system which provides over
eighty per cent of the costs of education in each state.
In the Canadian province of New Brunswick, local control
has increased since the Province assumed the financial
responsibilities from the local districts. The districts
now have control over curriculum matters which had been
10Arthur Wise, "School Finance Equalization
Lawsuits: A Model Legislative Response,” Yale Review of
Law and Social Action , Vol. II, No. 2, Winter 1971, p. 126.
11John Coons, William Clune and Stephen Sugarman,
Private Wealth and Public Education , (Cambridge, Mass:
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 1^9.
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a prior function of the Province. 12 In Great Britain,
the Ministry of Education is a conduit for the money,
but the schools are fiercely Independent .
U
Breaking the tie between local financing and
local control can be accomplished without doing harm to
the exercise of true local control, and it may strengthen
it. 1^ Governor William Milllken of Michigan, in response
to a question about the possibility of loss of local con-
trol stated;
The answer is that school boards will continue
to do the same things they do now with one
exception -- they won't have to fight mlllage
battles for school district survival. 15
If a full-state funding plan were instituted, the state
would have to engage in collective bargaining with teachers
instead of the local districts. A uniform salary schedule
for the state would be one consequences of full-state
assumption.
^
No one really knows whether any significant
erosion of local control would take place if full-state
l2Arthur Wise, "School Finance Equalization,"
p. 127.
^Harold Howe II, "Anatomy of a Revolution,"
Saturday Review , Nov. 20, 1971, p. 95.
^James Conant, "Full-State Funding," Financing
Public Schools , (Boston: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston,
Jan. 7 , 197^)7 Conference Series No. 71, p. H3.
^william Milllken, "Quality Education, the
Constitution and You," Michigan Association of School
Boards' Journal , Jan., 1972, p. 19.
l^Ccnant
,
"Full-State Funding," p. U^.
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funding were adopted in a large number of the states.
It is clear that the "loss of local control" argument is
being used strongly by wealthy school districts. They can
be expected to lose a certain amount of fiscal control,
and more importantly, their economic advantage over poorer
districts. A statewide property tax, which is the most
likely replacement for the local property tax, will fall
more heavily on wealthy districts. Rich districts now have
high- expenditure levels and low tax rates. With a full-
state funding plan, school taxes would rise in wealthy
districts, and the level of spending would be frozen at
its present level.^ The local control issue appears to
be as much a political smokescreen for rich districts as
a substantive issue.
It is very hard to talk about local control of
schools in isolation from state and federal governmental
actions. The local school district is not an autonomous
body, but rather is part of an interdependent group of
governmental agencies.^® Local control at the city level
is often not meaningful in relation to the educational
requirements of the students. In urban areas, non-educational
costs are greater for other municipal services. This is
^Report of the New York State Commission , p. 2.16.
ISsee Reshaping Government in Metropolitan Areas ,
(State of New York, l§7o). See also Serrano v., Priest
5 Cal 3d 584 (1971).
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known as municipal overburden, which is a result of a
high population concentration that requires more and
costlier services and a high percentage of low-income
residents which requires additional costly human services. 19
Often, state aid for schools serves as a replacement fund
for local taxes, and this acts to transfer educational
funds to other areas in the budget. For many school
districts, real local control or choice in the level of
spending for schools "is a cruel illusion under the existing
methods of school finance. " 21
The second objection to full-state assumption of
educational costs is that it will eliminate the development
*-9"Michelson and Grubb have begun to undertake
this task by examining the interrelationship among many
variables Including school tax rates, non-education tax
rates, local school revenue per pupil, local revenue for
non-education purposes, property valuation, state school
aid, federal school aid, mean family Income, average
daily attendance, children from low-income families and
population. Their work suggests many interesting inter-
relationships, causes and effects. One of their most
interesting conclusions is that 1 non-educational spending
is, by and large, determined by factors beyond the control
of communities, and tends not to be subject to discretion.'
Educational spending, on the other hand, is more constrained
by the availability of fiscal resources. The school tax rate
will be lowered if non-educational requirements are high
in burdened communities, while the non-education rate is not
similarly affected by a high school tax rate." Excerpt
from Paul Dimond," Serrano: A Victory of Sorts for Ethics,
Not Necessarily for Education," Yale Review of Law and Social
Action
,
Vol. II, No. 2, Winter 1971, p. 140.
2QReport of the New York State Commission , p. 2.43.
2J
-Serrano v. Priest, p. 620.
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of innovative programs in the high-expenditure " lighthouse
districts." It is assumed that the high-expenditure
districts create educational Innovations and that these
innovations spread to the other districts. Yet, there is
no reason why innovation should be accidental or based on
the wealth of the districts. The states could encourage
innovation by providing grants to districts in the areas
where educational problems are the worst. This would create
new "lighthouse districts" by design, rather than allowing
innovations to occur by chance or to be based on the wealth
of the district. One such planned innovation was proposed
by the Fleischman Commission in New York State. The "light-
house schools" would serve as the primary training insti-
tutions for all beginning teachers in the state. 22
Another argument used against full-state funding
of education is that the state's costs would be increased
greatly if per pupil spending were leveled up to the
highest spending district. This, in fact, has been the
experience in New Brunswick, but the system could be desig-
ned to spread the increased costs over a number of years
instead of raising all districts to the top during the
first year. 23 The Fleischman Commission recommended that
22tfiHiam Stevens, "Fleischman Unit Said to Favor
Local School control. "" New York Times , June 30, 1972, p. 22
23johns, et. al ., Alternative Programs fog
Financing Education , National Educational Finance projec ,
Yol. Vi 1971, p.~l25.
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the present level of spending In high-expenditure dist-
ricts be frozen until all the other districts were leveled
up to the highest level. During the first year, all
districts below the sixty-fifth percentile of the state's
highest per pupil expenditure level would be raised to the
sixty-fifth percentile. After the first year, school
districts would receive increments of fifteen per cent
per year until full equalization had taken place. 24 In
this manner, the high costs of leveling the poor districts
up to the top expenditure could be spread over a number
of years, and thus, keep the initial Increase in state
expenditures for schools to a manageable level. Arthur
Wise, working with a school finance commission in Maryland,
recommended a similar solution to the problem of increased
state costs as the one recommended by the Fleischman
Commission. 2 5
The controversial issues that surround full-state
assumption are more political than substantive. The threat
to the tax-sheltered, high-expenditure districts of the
suburbs lies at the heart of the local control issue.
It is also unclear whether a full-state assumption plan
would be supported by large cities. Joel Burke's data
24Report of the New York State Commission , p. 2.44.
2
^Arthur Wise, "Inequities in the Benefits and
Burdens of Public Education," Financing Public Schools ,
(Boston: Federal Reserve Bank, 1970) , Conference Series
No. 7, p. 57.
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suggests that it is unlikely unless a "municipal overbur-
den factor" is included. The politics of implementation
is very tough, and this has been demonstrated by the lack
of legislative remedies for school financing inequities in
the past. Only a court decision is likely to induce the
needed reforms in school finance in most states. The states
will probably take a "wait and see" attitude until the
U.S. Supreme Court settles the constitutional question
surrounding the local property tax when it hears Rodriguez
v. San Antonio sometime during the Winter 1972-73 session.
A negative decision would mean the end to a federal consti-
tutional attack on school finance inequities. It would
force the movement for equity in school finance back to
the state courts, using the Robinson v. Cahill 2? decision
as a precedent.
A victory for Rodriguez in the Supreme Court
would speed the reformulation of new school finance
laws in most states. It is very likely that, given a
victory for Rodriguez , most states would prefer to write
new school finance legislation without pressure of a
court order. Most have already set up school finance
commissions and are studying the issues in anticipation
of Serrano -type litigation.
26see Footnote 11.
27Roblnson v. Cahill Superior Court of New
Jersey-Hudson County Docket No. L-18704-69 (1972).
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Recommended School Finance Plan
The plan outlined below has been constructed
to equalize educational spending within states and within
school districts. Tax burden equalization is also an
objective of the recommended plan. Only action on the
part of the federal government could bring about equali-
zation of spending inequalities between states.
1. The state should assume the responsibility for
financing all public elementary and secondary
school costs (excluding federal aid). The state
revenue would be raised through the use of a prog-
ressive income tax on personal income. This would
equalize the tax burden by shifting it to the indi-
vidual's ability to pay and would remove the regres-
sive features of the property tax. 2®
2. The state will distribute the money to the school
districts on the basis of school registration. The
allocation will be on the basis of estimated costs
for different types of education of students or on
a "weighted student" basis. The weightings would
2®The author prefers the progressive income
tax as a source of revenue for education rather than a
statewide property tax, but it is very unlikely that
the property tax will be given up as a source of revenue
for an income tax. The Fleischman Commission has
^
recommended a state property tax as did Arthur Wise s
study group in Maryland.
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have to be calculated according to each state's needs,
but the National Educational Finance Project's figures
serve as an example:
TABLE 1
STUDENT WEIGHTING INDEX29
Educational Program Weighting
!• Basic elementary grades 1-6 1.00
2. Grades 7-9 1.20
3. Grades 10-12 l!40
4. Physically handicapped 3.25
5. Compensatory education 2.00
6. Vocational education 1.80
In addition, weightings for retardation, disadvantaged
students and a municipal overburden factor would be calcu-
lated and added to the per pupil expenditure level received
by the districts. The revenue allocated to the districts
would be distributed with the stipulation that each school
receive revenue according to its weighted pupil makeup.
This would allow for differences in spending between schools,
but rather on the basis of how much it costs to educate
the pupils inside. The irrational intradistrict spending
patterns identified by Patricia Sexton in Detroit, Michigan,
and in the Hobson v. Hansen decision^0 in Washington, D.C.,
would no longer be allowed to exist.
29johns, et al
.
,
p. 269.
3°See Patricia Sexton, Education .and Income ,
(New York: Viking Compass press, l§6l) and Hobson v .
"
Hansen II 327 F. Supp. 844 (1971).
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3. Regional education centers would be created by the
state to help relieve the expenses of high-cost educa-
tional services. Vocational education, transportation,
psychological and other special services could be
provided by regional educational centers.
4. Per-pupil expenditures would be leveled up to the
highest spending district in the state at the time
the plan was enacted. The leveling-up process would
be carried out over a number of years to help spread
the increased spending of the state over a number of
years. High- expenditure districts would be frozen
at their present levels until the rest of the districts
in the state were raised to their expenditure level.
The Fleischman Commission in New York recommended
that all districts below the sixty-fifth percentile
be brought up to that level the first year and raised
at a rate of fifteen per cent a year until the leveling-
up process reaches the top. The spacing out of the
leveling-up process allows for a smooth transition
from the old finance system and allows the increased
expenses accrued by the state to be spread over a
period of years.
5. Local school districts and school boards will retain
their present control over educational policies of
3lReport of the New York State Commission , p. 2.14.
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the school district. Matters such as curriculum
decisions and personnel decisions will remain always
with the local district. Collective bargaining will
become a statewide function rather than a local one,
and a state salary schedule for teachers will be
established
.
6. The author hopes that the federal government would
move to erase the interstate disparities in school
spending through a revenue-sharing program or assump-
tion of welfare costs.
If these proposals were adopted, an equitable
method for distributing school revenue and an equitable
method of financing schools would have been achieved.
CONCLUSIONS
Implications for Education
What will be the impact on education if the
wealth neutrality principle is upheld in Rodriguez v .
San Antonio in the U.S. Supreme Court? One thing is
clear. Most states will have to change their present
methods of financing schools. The states, if placed
under a Serrano mandate, would have a variety of alter-
native school financing plans to choose from as described
in Chapter IV. The courts have purposely avoided prescrlb
ing remedies for school finance inequities which are more
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appropriately the business of state legislatures. Which
plan the states select is pure conjecture at this point
in time, but the author has indicated his support for a
full-state funding plan.
It is also clear that by adopting a wealth
neutrality school financing system that money will be
redistributed. Poor districts are likely to get Increased
revenues for education relative to the wealthy districts.
Whether the money will be spent on the education of poor
children is unclear. Intradistrict disparities could
continue to exist unless the states moved to eliminate
the intradistrict disparities through the legislation
of the new school finance system.
It is not at all clear what kinds of educational
benefits will accrue to children in poor districts, if
any, because of the increased spending. More highly-paid
teachers, new buildings, smaller classes and new curriculum
are unlikely to affect cognitive learning independent of
family background. In all likelihood, the extra dollars
in poor districts will go to increased teacher salaries.
Daniel Moynihan observed:
The only certain result that will come from
this is that a particular cadre of middle-class
persons in the possession of certain licenses --
that is to say, teachers -- will receive more
public money than they do now. 32
52Daniel Moynihan, "Can the Courts and Money
Do It?," New York Times , Jan.. 10, 1972, p. E24.
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i’he lllcely result will be that no changes In present
educational practices coming out of a favorable decision
in Rodriguez in the Supreme Court.
A victory for Rodriguez could have a long-
range impact on school finance and national finance that
no one has predicted. The national tax structure could
change drastically if the Nixon Administration pushed
seriously for the adoption of a value-added tax to raise
revenue for education and other expenditures. In January,
1972, President Nixon recommended that a value-added tax,
a form of a national sales tax, be used to relieve the
pressure of the local property tax in financing education. 33
A value-added tax would increase the regressivity of the
national tax system rather than decrease it. 3^ Nixon
has since backed away from his position on the value-
added tax, but the ultimate impact of the wealth neutrality
principle may not be the one that was anticipated by
those who developed it.
Another long-range implication of a victory for
Rodriguez in the Supreme Court may be in the area of
low-cost housing. It is possible, if the S errano principle
were adopted, that it would stop suburban communities
33Frank Fowlkes, "Administration Leans to Value-
Added Tax to Help Solve National Fiscal Crisis," National
Journal , Feb. 5» 1972, pi 210.
3^Leonard Silk, "Value Added: Guess Who Finally
pays the Tax," New York Times , Feb. 6, 1972, p. E3.
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from using the argument that the school districts could
not afford to educate the children who live In low-cost
housing. 55 j)0 argue that the cost of education for child-
ren from low-cost housing developments would no longer be
a legitimate or "respectable" argument. The racial and
social objection of the suburbs to low-cost housing would
certainly persist, but it might make it more difficult to
fight low-income housing on purely economic grounds.
Another potential long-range implication of the
Serrano principle is in the area of other municipal services.
The California Supreme Court argued that the wealth neutra-
lity principle was not applicable to fire protection,
police protection and other municipal services. 56
The issue of the applicability of wealth neutrality to
other governmental services will be tested in the courts.
In June, 1972, two suits were filed contending that the
S errano principle could be applied to police and fire
protection in Marin County and in Los Angeles County. 57
The courts will have to decide if the wealth neutrality
principle is applicable to other municipal services.
35lntroduction, Yale Review of Law and Social
Action
,
Vol. II, No. 2, Winter 19?1, p. 1^9.
56serrano v » Priest , pp. 622-23.
37 jhe .educational Commission of the States
Legislative Review^ Vol. II , No . 14, July 10, 1972 , p. 2.
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Possible changes In the national tax structure
may result from the acceptance of the wealth neutrality
principle. The wealth neutrality principle negates
economic arguments against low-income housing, which Is
synonomous with Integration In urban areas. The acceptance
of the S errano principle is not likely to speed racial
integration, but it will demonstrate more conclusively that
It is racism, not increased school costs, which makes
suburban communities fight low-income housing.
If the Supreme Court overturns the wealth
neutrality principle, then the battle to gain equity In
school finance will be moved to the state constitutional
level as in the Robinson v. Cahill decision. In either
event, education is not likely to change much concerning
its impact on children, whether the Serrano principle
wins or loses in the courts.
A comment that Francis Keppel, a former U.S.
Commissioner of Education, made at a recent school finance
conference at Harvard University sums up this author's
feelings about the potential impact of the S errano for
education — victorious or not in the Supreme Court.
It looks to me as if educators had better not
assume that actions of legislatures or courts
are going to deal with the fundamental issue,
which is the guestion of equity in the handling
of children. 3o
38p rancis Keppel, "The Continuing Responsibility
of Education," Financing Public Schools , (Boston: Federal
Reserve Bank), Conference Series No. 7, Jan., ±9(d, P* 5
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Equity In the distribution of school revenue Is an
essential flrBt step toward the attainment of Improved
educational quality for poor and minority students, but
It Is only a beginning.
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NATIONWIDE MEDIAN TEST SCORES FOR
1ST AND 12TH-GRADE PUPILS, FALL 1965
Racial or Ethic Group
Puerto Indian Mexican Orient-
Ricans Ameri- Ameri- al
cans cans Ameri-
cans Negro Majority
1st grade:
Nonverbal 45.8 53.0 50.1 56.6 43.4 54.1
Verbal 44.9 47.8 46.5 51.6 45.4 59.2
12th grade:
Nonverbal 43.3 47.1 45.0 51.6 40.9 52.0
Verbal 43.1 43.7 43.8 49.6 40.9 52.1
Reading 42.6 44.3 44.2 48.8 42.2 51.9
Mathematics 43.7 45.9 45.5 51.3 41.8 51.8
General Information 41.7 44.7 43.3 49.0 40.6 52.3
Average of the 5 tests 43.1 45.1 44.4 50.1 41.1 52.0
Source: Coleman Report, Equal Educational Opportunity, 1966, p. 20
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APPENDIX ' B*'
"Scribner Asks for Improved Instruction in Reading,"
New York: Times
,
Peb. 20, 1972, p. 55* The data was
released by Chancellor Scribner on Feb. 19, 1972, and
the report compared this city's reading averages against
the national average. The chart shows, by grade, how
far the city's pupils were behind the national
average.
Grade 2-2 months
Grade 3-6 months
Grade 4-9 months
Grade 5-9 months
Grade 6-9 months
Grade 7-1 year, 8 months
Grade 8-1 year, 6 months
Grade 9-1 year, 4 months
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April 14, 1972
To: The Friends of the School Finance
Reform Movemr^
From: R. Stephen Browning
Subject: Status Report on School Finance Reform
RODR]gUEZ V. SAN ANTONIO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT
^^On Monday, April 17, the State of Texas will file its jurisdictional
statement in the Su^r^me~Court for its appeal of the Rodriguez decision.
The plaintiffs will have thirty days to respond to the state's pleading, and
then the court will decide whether it shall hear the case or dispose of it
summarily. If it decides to hear the case, it will not do so until sometime
after the beginning of the October 1972 term.
Some of you may be considering participating as amicus curiae in
the Rodriguez appeal. If that is the case, I would very much appreciate
it if you would respond to me on the following three questions:
a) Do you plan on preparing and filing an amicus
curiae brief?
b) Would you be interested in signing an amicus
curiae brief prepared by Lawyers’ Committee
volunteers ?
c) Would you be willing to help us defray part of
the printing costs for one or more amicus curiae
briefs?
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DIRECTORY OF ORGANIZATIONS
One month ago the Lawyers' Committee, in conjunction with two
other organizations, compiled 500 copies of a 50 page directory of
organizations interested in school finance reform. The directory, which
we planned to send to everyone on our school finance mailing list, gave
a thumbnail sketch on the various organizations, with a description of
their school finance programs, a listing of their resources, and the names,
addresses, and phone numbers of their contact people. Unfortunately, we
grossly underestimated the demand for the directory. So, if you do not
receive a copy with this letter, please let me know whether you would like
one, and if we prepare another edition, I will send you a copy.
NEW PUBLICATIONS ON SCHOOL FINANCE
The past few months has seen the publication of several significant
documents pertaining to school finance reform. The first was the long
awaited publication of the findings and recommendations of the President's
Commission on School Finance. Responsibility for the dissemination of
the final report of the President’s Commission (147 pages long) and the 20
or so back up appendices has been given to the U. S. Office of Education.
For information on the availability of these reports, I suggest that you
contact Mr. Charles B. Saunders, Jr.
,
Deputy Commissioner for External
Relations, U. S. Office of Education, Room 4143, FOB 6, Washington,
D. C. 20202.
For those of you who are interested in the education of Mexican
American children in the southwest, I commend to you a four volume
study recently published by the U. S. Commission on Civil Rights. The
fourth volume of the study, which deals primarily with school finance
problems in the Southwest, will be released sometime early this summer.
Copies of these reports can be obtained by writing the U. S. Commission
on Civil Rights, Washington, D. C. 20425. J
THE STATUS OF LITIGATION
Since our January newsletter was published, the list of school
finance cases has^ nearly doubled. There are now at least 45 suits pending
in at least 27 states. Although the appeal of the Rodriguez_case_to the
"Supreme Court may have slackenedThe pace of prosecution of some of
fhese* suitsy many of thenrareadvancing rapidly. To help improve the
quaHty~of the prosecution of thes^lufs'we'are currently planning a second
school finance litigation conference to be held in mid-summer somewhere
in the mid-west. In a month or so I will be back in touch with more details
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for those of you who are actively involved in litigation.
LEGISLATION
A number of states have already began to respond to the Serrano
line of cases. The most common response has been to appoint school
finance commissions. However, in some legislatures bills have already
been introduced which comport with the ’’fiscal neutrality” principle. To
get a better idea of what is going on nationally in the various state legisla-
tures on the school finance question, I suggest that you contact Dr. Russell
B. Vlaanderen at the Education Commission of the States and ask to be put,
on ECS’s mailing list for its weekly publication, "Legislative Review”
(300 Lincoln Tower, 1860 Lincoln Street, Denver, Colorado 80203).
One of the more promising legislative activities on the school finance——'
scene was the establishment of ’’The Special Committee on School Finance”
recently announced by the National LeglslatTveTConference^ This Committee
is preparing a set ofrecommendations whichwi 11 be presented to the full
National Legislative Conference at its annual meeting in early August of
this year. Hopefully, out of this will result a practical set of materials
explaining the constitutional alternatives available for financing public
schools. I will be back in touch with you as soon as we learn more about
the development and availability of these legislative materials.
STATISTICAL INFORMATION
I have enclosed with this letter two statistical tables which I trust
you will find most informative. The first is a comprehensive, yet concise,
compilation of school finance data prepared by ECS. The second item,
prepared by the staff of the President’s Commission on School Finance,
lists the additional dollar amounts it would cost in each state to level up
to the 50th, 60th, 70th, 80th, 90th, and 95th percentiles of current per-
pupil expenditures.
:jc
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COST OF EQUALIZING EXPENDITURES TO VARIOUS
PUPIL' PERCENTILE LEVELS, BY STATE
95th per-
centile
90th per-
centile
80th per-
centile
70th per-
centile
60th per-
centile
50th per-
centile
Alabama
(millions) (millions) (millions) (millions) (millionTY (mllllonsT
$ 50.5 $ 40.2 $ 22.2 $ 17.5 $ 12.6 $ 5.4Alaska 10.2 10.2 9.1 4.0 0.2 0.2
Arizona 89.9 79.6 55.5 37.3 13.8 10.3
Arkansas 49.0 37.1 19.5 15.5 12.3 7.3
California 1382.2 731.2 392.0 216.4 174.0 141.7
Colorado 65.0 65.0 65.0 43.6 16.9 14.6
Connecticut 179.6 126.8 83.5 62.1 35.3 22.9
Delaware 32.3 32.3 7.7 5.7 3.0 1.6
District of - - - _
Columbia
Florida 185.1 117.2 117.2 83.5 45.2 35.8
Georgia 188.9 162.6 57.9 25.5 23.5 16.0
Hawaii 10.5 8.7 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.4
Idaho 56.9 33.6 14.4 14.4 9.6 5.1
Illinois 680.6 401.6 294.4 294.4 194.1 96.8
Indiana 161.9 112.9 76.9 71.3 47.9 33.0
Iowa 112.0 85.4 42.1 30.9 24.8 12.6
Kansas 101.7 69.6 26.6 16.9 11.8 11.8
Kentucky 109.6 57.1 57.1 31.9 14.6 9.8
Louisiana 66.4 53.6 27.8 17.6 12.1 11.3
Maine 23.1 23.1 16.7 10.3 7.3 5.2
Maryland 175.2 175.2 28.1 28.1 24.2 14.3
Massachusetts 344.6 236.0 121.9 68.4 51.1 42.4
Michigan 473.1 326.6 186.5 125.5 109.9 87.3
Minnesota 107.2 107.2 76.0 57.4 33.6 22.5
Mississippi 56.5 40.6 35.0 21.5 16.1 10.8
Missouri 143.0 107.1 105.8 61.6 46.2 28.7
Montana 337.0 62.5 34.8 19.6 17.2 9.5
Nebraska 79.0 48.3 19.2 11.5 10.5 7.7
Nevada 15.7 8.1 1.3 1.3 0.0 0.0
New Hampshire 20.3 16.9 11.1 7.5 3.6 2.3
New Jersey 372.2 285.6 164.5 106.5 69.6 42.4
New Mexico 33.1 25.3 14.4 5.2 2.9 0.9
New York 998.9 537.7 275.8 275.8 275.8 244.5
North Carolina 84.9 84.9 42.5 36.0 28.7 19.5
North Dakota 24.1 17.7 14.4 8.2 5.5 4.9
Ohio 530.8 471.8 256.9 182.7 136.8 79.5
Oklahoma 111.2 55.4 36.0 23.5 13.4 13.2
Oregon 70.4 54.6 31.8 17.7 13.8 13.8
Pennsylvania 456.8 456.8 351.7 180.3 113.9 62.7
Rhode Island 45.3 45.3 18.1 13.9 8.1 5 • 3
South Carolina 28.2 28.2 19.4 14.5 6.7 6.4
South Dakota 30.8 20.1 10.8 5.7 2.6 2.6
Tennessee 88.9 88.9 64.4 54.0 33.7 14.9
Texas 394.7 263.4 144.1 92.5 55.7 40.9
Utah 33.5 13.1 9.4 7.0 1.7 1.4
Vermont 26.9 21.4 13.7 11.9 8.2 4.8
Virginia 140.3 130.8 130.8 68.8 43.3 21.7
(continued)
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95th per- 90th per- 80th per- 70th per- 60th per- 50th per-
centile centilc centile centile centile centile
(millions) (millions) (milliono) (millions) (millions)
(
millions)
Washington 107.2 107.2 79.3 55.9 43.3 28.0
West Virginia 31.4 30.8 16.8 12.3 11.3 4.9
Wisconsin 13.4 9.0 5.8 3.5 2.1 2.1
Wyoming 38.8 27.1 16.1 8.5 4.0 1.3
Totals $8758.8 $6151.4 $3724.9 $2588.5 $1855.4 $1285.0
million million million million million million
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March 6, 1972
R. Stephen Browning, Esq.
Staff Attorney
Lawyers' Committee for Civil
Rights under Law
Suite 520
733 Fifteenth Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20005
Re: Joseph F. Timilty, et al
vs. Francis W. Sargent, Governor of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, et al
United States District Court
Dear Mr. Browning:
Please excuse this less than prompt response to your
letter of February 8, 1972. I thank you for forwarding
to me the Lawyers' Committee school finance litigation
packet, which has proved to be most helpful to me in ray
preparation of a memorandum in support of a motion for
summary judgment. I have enclosed herewith for your
information a copy of the Defendants' Answer in the
above- captioned action.
With respect to the critical issue you raised in your
letter respecting the questionable benefit to the City of
Boston resulting from the filing and prosecution of the
suit, I can only respond by stating that I am very much
aware of possible adverse effects that could be visited
upon the City of Boston if our challenge of the present
scheme for funding public education is successful. As you
will note from the declaration in this action, we are not
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seeking injunctive relief but merely hope to precipitate
a legislative response guided by the standard of "fiscal
neutrality" so aptly set forth in the Serrano decision
and its prodigy,
I hope that the filing of a motion for summary judgment
will stimulate the Massachusetts Legislature which to this
date has done little or nothing substantive by way of
investigation of alternative methods for funding public
education. There had been filed with the Legislature last
year a report of a special commission respecting taxation
in the Commonwealth. The implementation of the recommenda-
tions contained in that report, and the possible alternative
for funding public education, should fit together very well.
In sum, I thank you for your offer to assist us in a
clearing house capacity and would very much appreciate any
and all information you could forward to us. In fact, we
may seek your more active assistance in that myself and Mr.
Paul W. Goodrich are proceeding pro bono and at the largess
of our respective firms, the net effect"of which is to force
us to do a considerable amount of the necessary work at odd
. hours
.
JJM: ss
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INTRASTATE DISPARITIES IN PER PUPIL EXPENDITURES 1969-70
Alabama
Alaska Revenue/pupils
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
it^ihsas
Kentucky
Louisiana
M*i,ne
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana average of groups
Nebraska average of groups
Njsyhda
Ne^ Hampshire
Neifr Jersey 1968-69
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota county averages
Ohio
Oklahoma
OJrOgon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
High Low index
581 $344 1.7
1,810 480 3.8
2,223 436 5.1
664 434 1.9
2,414 569 4.2
2,801 444 6.3
1,311 499 2.6
1,081 633 1.7
1,036 593 1.7
736 365 2.0
1,763 474 3.7
2,295 391 5.9
965 447 2.1
1,167 592 2.0
1,831 454 4.0
885 358 2.5
892 499 1.8
1,555 229 6.8
1,037 635 1.6
1,281 515 2.5
1,364 491 2.8
903 370 2.4
825 283 3.0
1,699 213 8.0
1,716 539 3.2
1,175 623 1.9
1,679 746 2.3
1,191 311 3.8
1,485 400 3.7
1,183 477 2.5
1,889 669 2.8
733 467 1.4
1,623 686 2.3
1,685 413 4.0
2,566 342 7.5
1,432 399 3.5
1,401 484 2.9
1,206 531 2.3
610 397 1.5
1,741 350 5.0
700 315 2.4
5,334 264 20.2
1,515 533 2.3
1,517 357 4.2
(continued)
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High/low
Low index
Virginia 1 ,126 441 2.6
Washington 3,406 434 7.8
West Virginia 722 502 1.4
Wisconsin 1,432 344 4.2
Wyoming 14,554 618 23.6
NOTES
For New Jersey data are for fiscal year 1969 since fiscal
year 1970 data were not yet available.
For Alaska data represent revenue per pupil.
For Montana and Nebraska data are high and low of average
for districts grouped by size.
For North Dakota data are averages of expenditures of all
districts within a county.
Data are not fully comparable between States since they
are based entirely on what data the individual State included
in their expenditures-per-pupil analysis.
Source: State Reports and Verbal contacts with State Officials.
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COMPUTATION OF PROGRESSIVITY VALUES (T VALUES)OF ALL TAXES—FEDERAL
, STATE AND LOCAL, 1968(EXCLUDING SOCIAL SECURITY AND UNEMPLOYMENT TAXES)
PROGRESSIVITY
AMOUNT VALUE
TAX (in millions) (T Value)
TOTAL FEDERAL TAXES:*
1 . Individual income 78,155 50
2. Corporate income 29,897 24
3. Estate and gift 3,015 50
4. Sales, excises & other 14,387 16
TOTAL 125,454 39.90++
TOTAL STATE TAXES:*
1 . Individual and
corporate income 8,749 35
2. Sales, gross receipts 20,979 15
3. Property 912 14
4. Estate and gift 872 50
5. All other 4,888 14
TOTAL 36,400 20. 49++
LOCAL SCHOOL TAXES:**
1 . Property 14,157 14
2. All other 289 14
TOTAL 14,446 14.00+
*Statistical Abstract of the United States , 1969,
State Government Finances in 1968, U. S. Dept, of
Commerce, Bureau of the Census.
**N.E.A. Estimates of School Statistics, 1968-69
Weighted average.
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CLASSIFICATION OF THE STATES INTO TYPES
SCHOOL SUPPORT PLANS USED FOR THE SCHOOL YEAR, 1968-69*
Equalization Programs
Guaranteed
Valuation
Complete
State
and
Flat Grant Strayer- Percentage or Tax Federal
Programs Haig Equalizing Yield Plan Support
Arizona Alabama Iowa Utah Hawaii
Arkansas Alaska Massachusetts Wisconsin
Connecticut California New York
Delaware Colorado Pennsylvania
New Mexico Florida Rhode Island
North Carolina Georgia Vermont
South Carolina Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wyoming
These classifications deal only with the principal state
appropriation for the public schools in each state.
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